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Articles
Sacrificing Sovereignty:
How Tribal-State Tax Compacts Impact
Economic Development in Indian Country
PIPPA BROWDE†
Economic development is a critical component of tribal sovereignty. When a state asserts taxing
authority within Indian Country, there is potential for overlapping, or juridical, taxation over
the same transaction. Actual or even potential juridical taxation threatens economic
development opportunities for tribes. For many years, tribes and states have entered into
intergovernmental agreements called tax compacts to reduce or eliminate juridical taxation.
Existing literature has done little more than mention tax compacts with cursory cost-benefit
analyses of the agreements. This is the first Article to critically examine the role tax compacts
serve in promoting tribes’ economic development.
This Article analyzes economic development activities in Indian Country as two types of
transactions: when the tribe or tribal enterprise is engaging as a retailer, and when a tribe or
tribal enterprise is working with non-tribal entities in joint ventures. Using these categories of
transactions as a framework, and looking to existing compacts between various tribes and states
as examples, the analysis focuses on the impact compacts have on economic development in
Indian Country. This Article argues that compacts do not live up to the promise of resolving
juridical taxation in a manner that fosters economic development opportunities for tribes.

† Professor of Law, Alexander Blewett III School of Law, University of Montana. The University of
Montana is located on the traditional lands of Indigenous peoples, including the Séliš, Ksanka, and Qlispé. Many
others, including the Blackfeet, Nez Perce, Shoshone, Bannock, and Coeur D’Alene, had and continue to have
a presence in the area. This Author and the University of Montana acknowledge the role the U.S. legal system
has played in the removal of Indigenous peoples from these lands, and, through commitment to education,
service, and scholarship, strive to improve the quality of justice for future generations. Doing so demands respect
for tribal sovereignty and Indigenous cultures as well as accountability to the needs and perspectives of
Indigenous people, who, from time immemorial to the present and until the end of time, protect and remain
connected with this land. This Author thanks Dean Kevin Washburn for early conversations that set the course
for this study of tribal-state tax compacts. This Author also thanks participants of the Junior Tax Scholars
Workshop at the University of Colorado who read an earlier draft of this Article, as well as Mitch WerBell V
and Jacqueline Baldwin LeClair for student research.
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INTRODUCTION
In seeking to assert civil regulatory authority in Indian Country,1 state and
local governments encroach on tribal jurisdiction and sovereignty.2 When a state
asserts its taxing authority within Indian Country, there are serious implications
for tribal economic development.3 Economic development in Indian Country is
1. A note on terminology is warranted at the outset. In an effort to be consistent with the field of Federal
Indian law, this Article uses the terms “Indians,” “Indian tribes,” and “Indian Country,” as follows. Under federal
law, the terms “Indian tribes” or “Indian Nation” commonly refer to a group of Indigenous Americans the federal
government recognizes as a group, or with whom the federal government has a political relationship. FELIX S.
COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.02[2] (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2017). “Indian tribe”
may also have an enhanced meaning to its members beyond political status that includes shared cultural,
religious, and linguistic elements, and a shared relationship to specific land. Id. Under federal law, the term
“Indians” refers to individual Indigenous Americans, and is a political delegation. Id. § 3.03[4]; Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–55 (1974). There is no singular definition of “Indians,” which depends on the legal
context. COHEN, supra, § 3.03. Although there has been a trend toward referring to tribal members as “Native
American” or “Indigenous,” the term “Indians” is commonly used to refer to Indigenous American people as a
group, as it is in this Article. Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy Horse,
27 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1003 n.1 (1995). The term “non-Indians” refers to individuals who are not Indian,
whereas “nonmember Indians” refers to individuals who are Indian but not members of the specific tribe or tribal
territory where the tax is imposed. COHEN, supra, § 8.06 (explaining how the law on non-Indians and nonmember
Indians are the same for purposes of the reach of state taxation in Indian Country). The term “Indian Country”
refers to the geographic area where Indian laws and customs and federal laws relating to Indians generally apply.
Id. § 3.04[1]. Indian Country is broadly defined to include “formal and informal reservations, dependent Indian
communities, and Indian allotments, whether restricted or held in trust by the United States.” Id. (citing Okla.
Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993)). The question of land status and whether a
transaction occurs within Indian Country is of critical importance to the analysis of taxation authority. For a
detailed explanation beyond the scope of this Article, see Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and Doing Business in Indian
Country, 60 ME. L. REV. 1, 9–13 (2008). Though there are general principles of Federal Indian law that relate to
state taxation in Indian Country, Indian tribes are not a homogenous group. There are 574 federally recognized
Indian tribes in the United States, each with its own legal structure, laws and rules, culture, and economy. Indian
Entities Recognized by and Eligible To Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 87
Fed. Reg. 4636, 4636 (Jan. 28, 2022) [hereinafter Indian Entities]; see also 25 C.F.R. § 83.6(a) (2015).
References to “Indian Country” as a general geographic location denote a specific tribe with a specific group of
members. See Indian Entities, supra.
2. Disputes between states and tribes over the extent of a state’s jurisdiction over tribal lands or members
have existed since the early founding of our nation. Among other legal issues, The Cherokee Cases involved the
state of Georgia’s attempts to enforce its laws over Cherokee territory. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1, 2 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 520 (1832); see also Rennard Strickland, The
Tribal Struggle for Indian Sovereignty: The Story of the Cherokee Cases, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 61 (Carole
Goldberg, Kevin K. Washburn & Philip P. Frickey eds., 2011). In fact, disputes between states and tribes predate
the U.S. Constitution and may have shaped the Constitution’s federalist structure. Professor Richard D. Pomp’s
article, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Indian Commerce Clause and State Taxation, 63 TAX LAW. 897 (2010),
examines the history of the Indian Commerce Clause, including the tensions that existed between colonists and
centralized control by the Crown with respect to Indian affairs. “Disputes between some of the Southern states
and certain Indian tribes continued after the [Revolutionary War] and underscored the need for a strong national
government that could impose order.” Id. at 932. These disputes occupied the United States Supreme Court’s
docket in the nation’s early years, and more than 200 years later, the Court is still hearing the same types of
disputes. In 2019, the Supreme Court considered two cases in which the central issue was the application of state
law in Indian Country. See Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 586 U.S. 1, 14–18 (2019)
(holding a Washington state tax on motor fuel wholesalers preempted by a treaty between the United States and
the Yakama Indian Nation); Herrera v. Wyoming, 587 U.S. 1, 17 (2019) (holding that Crow Tribe members have
treaty rights to hunt on unoccupied lands outside the Tribe’s reservation despite Wyoming hunting laws to the
contrary).
3. See infra Part I.B.
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already tricky business. A number of factors, including lack of infrastructure,
uncertainties in the application of commercial law, complications with
transacting on land held in trust by the federal government, barriers to capital
and lending, and geographic isolation, all work against a tribe seeking to attract
investment and foster economic development.4 In addition to these challenges,
the uncertainty of the tax consequences of various transactions can chill business
opportunities for tribes and discourage non-Indians who wish to do business in
Indian Country.5
The United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on what, where, when,
and how a state may impose its taxing authority in Indian Country may be one
of the most complex and unpredictable legal issues tribes and states continue to
face today.6 Because this vexing problem only seems to lead to litigation, tribes
and states are often motivated to engage in intergovernmental agreements, called
compacts, to preemptively resolve potential tax conflicts.7
Most of the existing literature on taxation in Indian Country has focused
on when more than one sovereign (i.e., the state and a tribe) claim legal authority
to tax the same transaction. This double taxation problem is called juridical
taxation.8 Juridical taxation in Indian Country creates numerous problems for
tribes seeking to create economic development opportunities and for states
seeking to enforce taxing authority within tribal territories. It also puts pressure
on tribes to choose between tax revenue and economic development.9
Tribal-state tax compacts are heralded as a cooperative and positive
mechanism for tribes and states.10 The compacts are both a sacrifice and
expression of sovereignty for tribal governments.11 Tax revenue compacts
enable tribes to control, at least to some degree, their sovereignty from state

4. Mark J. Cowan, Double Taxation in Indian Country: Unpacking the Problem and Analyzing the Role
of the Federal Government in Protecting Tribal Governmental Revenues, 2 PITT. TAX REV. 93, 95 (2005); Adam
Crepelle, How Federal Indian Law Prevents Business Development in Indian Country, 23 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 683,
691–92 (2021).
5. The uncertainties of the tax consequences of transactions in Indian Country are discussed infra Part
I.B.3.
6. See Pomp, supra note 2, at 903–04 (“[T]he issues raised by the taxation of Indians, the tribes, and those
doing business with them are sui generis—and complicated, even by tax standards.”).
7. See infra Part I.C.
8. MINDY HERZFELD, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN A NUTSHELL 5 (12th ed. 2020) (defining juridical
taxation as the existence of “[o]verlapping claims of taxing authority”). The seminal work in this area is by
Professor Richard D. Pomp. See Pomp, supra note 2; see also Cowan, supra note 4, at 95; Scott A. Taylor, A
Judicial Framework for Applying Supreme Court Jurisprudence to the State Income Taxation of Indian Traders,
2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 841, 872–73; Russel Lawrence Barsh, Issues in Federal, State, and Tribal Taxation of
Reservation Wealth: A Survey and Economic Critique, 54 WASH. L. REV. 531, 571 (1979); Richard J. Ansson,
Jr., State Taxation of Non-Indians Whom Do Business with Indian Tribes: Why Several Recent Ninth Circuit
Holdings Reemphasize the Need for Indian Tribes To Enter into Taxation Compacts with Their Respective State,
78 OR. L. REV. 501, 503 (1999).
9. See infra Part I.B.3.
10. See Cowan, supra note 4, at 133–36.
11. See infra Part I.C.1.
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encroachment.12 They also help tribes control and maintain economic
development within their territories.13 For states, compacts are a way to protect
some of their revenue bases and eliminate cross-territorial enforcement
problems.14 For both tribes and states, compacts provide certainty.15 However,
the question remains how compacts impact economic development
opportunities for tribes.
This Article is the first to critically examine the relationship between tax
revenue compacts and economic development opportunities for tribes. It argues
that compacts do not live up to their promise of resolving juridical taxation in a
way that promotes the economic development activities and opportunities that
tribes need.
Part I provides necessary background on the history of Indian law and
policy that set the stage for state taxation in Indian Country. This historical
background includes an explanation of the law on tribal-state tax compacts, as
well as specific examples of compacts used to address juridical taxation. Part II
categorizes economic development activities in Indian Country into two types
of transactions: (1) where the tribe or tribal entity acts as a retailer, directly
transacting with customers or consumers, and (2) where the tribe partners with
non-tribal entities or businesses to create economic ventures. These transaction
categories are used to analyze the impact compacts have on economic
development in Indian Country. Part II then analyzes the impact compacts have
on tribal economic development activities in three movements. First, using the
two categories of transactions identified, Part II examines the parties’ incentives
to compact and correlates them with economic development opportunities.
Second, applying tax policy principles, it explores the negative impact compacts
have on economic development. Third, it then offers a framework other than
compacting for resolving juridical taxation in Indian Country that deserves
further research.
I. BACKGROUND
Tax revenue compacts are touted as practical solutions to the legal problem
of determining the scope and limits of tribal and state taxing authority within
Indian Country.16 To understand and analyze the value of these compacts,
background on existing law and policy is necessary. Current law and policy are
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra Part I.C.1.
See Cowan, supra note 4, at 134.
See infra Part I.C.2.
For early work focused on cataloguing compacts, see generally COMMISSION ON STATE-TRIBAL
RELATIONS, STATE-TRIBAL AGREEMENTS: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY (1981). For work advocating the wider
use of compacts, see David H. Getches, Negotiated Sovereignty: Intergovernmental Agreements with American
Indian Tribes as Models for Expanding Self-Government, 1 REV. CONST. STUD. 120, 147 (1993). For focus on
how model compacts help tribes with lesser bargaining power, see Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in Native
American Law: Models for Expanded Usage, 112 HARV. L. REV. 922, 936 (1999) [hereinafter
Intergovernmental Compacts].
16. See Cowan, supra note 4, at 133.
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inextricable from the history of colonialism and the historical relationship
between Europeans and tribes. Thus, this Article starts with background on the
history of Indian law and policy, then turns to existing law on state taxation in
Indian Country. It then describes the effect of existing law on tribal economic
development and provides background on tribal-state tax compacts.
A. THE HISTORY OF INDIAN LAW AND POLICY SETS THE STAGE FOR STATE
TAXATION IN INDIAN COUNTRY.
The history of Indian law and policy is normally broken down into multiple
“eras” of policy.17 For purposes of this abbreviated background, it is divided into
the following eras: colonial times and formative era, post-treaty-making through
allotment, Indian reorganization and termination, and self-determination.18
1.

Indian Law and Policy Beginning in Colonial Times Through the
Middle of the 1800s

Prior to European contact, tribes were “independent [and] selfgoverning.”19 Post-contact, tribal sovereignty was reduced by European
colonialists who imposed their own legal constructs on the Indigenous
Americans.20 This is the starting point for understanding the evolution of tribal
sovereignty and the three-way relationship between tribes, the U.S. government,
and the states.
The early U.S. government, first with the Continental Congress and later
the Senate, negotiated treaties with tribes to make peace following the

17. See generally, e.g., Kevin Washburn, What the Future Holds: The Changing Landscape of Federal
Indian Policy, 130 HARV. L. REV. 200 (2017).
18. This breakdown appears somewhat random. This randomness reflects the vacillation in how the federal
government has respected tribal sovereignty and treated tribal governments. There are vacillations within the
second era as policy shifted from allotment to reorganization and back to termination. See infra Part I.A.3. More
importantly, a reader unfamiliar with Indian law should note that this is only the briefest history of the past 500
years, a subject to which entire books are devoted. The seminal treatise of Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian
Law contains an entire chapter on this history. See COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.01; see also generally CHARLES
WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS (2005); PHILIP J. DELORIA & NEAL
SALISBURY, A COMPANION TO AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORY (Philip J. Deloria & Neal Salisbury eds., 2008).
19. COHEN, supra note 1, § 4.01[1][a]. The term “sovereignty,” means, “[a]t its most basic, . . . the inherent
right or power to govern.” WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 73 (6th ed. 2015).
The foundations for tribal sovereignty existed before European contact with the Americas. Id. (“[T]ribes were
sovereign by nature and necessity; they conducted their own affairs and depended upon no outside source of
power to legitimize their acts of government.”).
20. “The present right of tribes to govern their members and territories flows from a preexisting
sovereignty limited, but not abolished, by the tribes’ inclusion within the territorial bounds of the United States.”
COHEN, supra note 1, § 6.02[1]. As evidenced by the history of brutality with which colonial Europeans treated
Indigenous Americans, the legal theories were not uniform in respecting tribal sovereignty and ownership of
land by tribes and their members. Id. § 1.02[1] & nn.2–22 (explaining early doctrines that shaped European
relations with American Indians). It is important to note that while European conquistadores treated Native
American Indians with brutality, their behavior often was inconsistent with or violated Spanish law, which did
in fact recognize the property and liberty rights of Native American Indians. Id. § 1.02[1] & nn.18–23.
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Revolutionary War.21 Early treaties reflected diplomatic agreements to end
hostilities between governments, create political alliances, delineate criminal
jurisdiction, and facilitate trade.22 These treaties reflected the United States’
desire to “bury the hatchet” with Indian Nations to establish peace and negotiate
territorial boundaries.23 After the adoption of the Constitution, for the next
eighty years, the United States engaged in treaty-making with Indian tribes.24
Treaties are still relevant today. They are binding law that apply between the
parties, usually the U.S. government and a tribe (or tribes). In analyzing these
treaties, courts invoke special canons of construction construing ambiguities in
favor of the tribes; construe treaties as specific grants of rights from the tribes,
with all other rights reserved to the tribal treaty-partner; and cannot find
abrogation without evidence of clear congressional intent.25
Treaties with tribes are similar in some respects to U.S. treaties with foreign
nations, such as containing terms relating to diplomacy, peace, and exchange of
prisoners.26 However, treaties with tribes differ in that many address tribes as
dependent nations, providing protection and containing terms regarding the
tribe’s cession of land to non-Indians.27
The three-way relationship between tribes, states, and the federal
government was initially delineated by Supreme Court jurisprudence.28 In two
of the Court’s early cases, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia29 and Worcester v.
Georgia,30 the Court recognized the unique political status of tribes as selfgoverning, referring to them as “domestic dependent nations” within the United
States.31 Specifically, the Court cited existence of early treaties between tribes
and European nations as evidence of tribal sovereignty that ought to be respected
by the United States.32

21. COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.02[2] & n.71; see also Pomp, supra note 2, at 929–31 & nn.121–30
(explaining the history of constitutional language pertaining to Indian tribes).
22. COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.02[2] & n.76 (offering the example of the first written treaty between the
Delaware Tribe and the United States).
23. Id. § 1.02[3] & nn.84–85.
24. Id. § 1.03[1] & n.1.
25. Id. § 1.03[1] & nn.3–5.
26. Id. § 1.03[1] & nn.12–23.
27. Id. § 1.03[1] & nn.24–34.
28. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515, 559 (1832). Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia, two early Supreme Court cases setting
forth the legal relationships between the three governments, are two out of the three cases referred to as the
Marshall Trilogy, because they were authored by then-Chief Justice John Marshall. Johnson v. M’Intosh is the
first case of the Marshall Trilogy. 21 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 543 (1823). In Johnson, the Court considered the
relationship between the federal government and tribal governments. Id. at 598. While there are important
questions and legal issues arising from the relationship between tribes and the federal government, they are
beyond the scope of this Article.
29. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
30. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 583.
31. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 2.
32. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 551–53.
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Additionally, Cherokee Nation and Worcester affirmed the United States’
assertion of supremacy over Indian affairs.33 In both cases, the Court considered
the applicability of Georgia state law within Indian Country.34 An aspect of
federal supremacy that the Court construed was the intent to “preserve[]” and
“insulate[] [tribal governments] from state interference.”35 In Worcester, the
Court famously stated that, absent some treaty or congressional action, “the laws
of Georgia can have no force” unless agreed upon by the Cherokee tribe itself.36
Unfortunately, as subsequent history and case law bore out, Worcester did not
resolve the tension between the boundaries of state and Indian Country
jurisdictions.37
2.

The End of Treaty-Making Through the Era of Allotment

The formative era of Federal Indian law ended in 1871, with the U.S.
government no longer dealing with tribes through treaties.38 Rather, the United
States began legislating policy with respect to Indian Nations as opposed to
treaty-making. The most marked shift from the past practice of treaty-making
came in 1887 with the passage of the General Allotment Act.39 The Act
“change[d] the role of Indians in American society,”40 by changing the
ownership structure of tribal land from tribally owned property to allotting
portions to individuals.41
Posited as a mechanism to “civilize and assimilate” Native American
Indian people, the reality of allotment was a loss of land ownership by tribes and
their members.42 Allotment created checkerboard patterns in ownership on
reservations, where some land was owned by non-Indians.43 The allotment era
resulted in an enormous loss of land for Native American Indians.44 In 1887,
tribes and tribal members collectively owned approximately 138 million acres.45

33. Id. at 561; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
34. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 3; Worcester, 31 U.S. at 521.
35. COHEN, supra note 1, § 4.01[1][a].
36. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
37. The language of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence only tells one dimension of the full story. After the
Supreme Court’s opinion delivered a win for the Cherokee people, Georgia refused to acknowledge and follow
the law. See Strickland, supra note 2, at 75–76. Furthermore, President Andrew Jackson did not enforce the law
as interpreted by the Supreme Court and removed the Cherokee people in the Trail of Tears. Id. at 76–79.
38. COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.03[9] & nn.351–61. But see id. for an explanation of how the shift was
procedural in nature and did not invalidate existing treaties or other non-legislative policy developments.
39. Pub. L. No. 49-119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 334, 339, 341–342, 348–
349, 354, 381).
40. COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.04 & nn.5–6.
41. Id. § 1.04 & n.8.
42. Id. § 1.04 & nn.10–15. The rules and process for allotment were complex, and included Indian sales of
land. Id.
43. Id. § 1.04 & nn.9–10.
44. Id. § 1.04 & n.11.
45. Id. § 1.04 & nn.7–8.
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Within fifty years of allotment policy, the amount of land was reduced to fortyeight million acres.46
The allotment era policies also included forced cultural assimilation.47 For
example, in 1924, federal legislation conferred U.S. citizenship upon all Native
American Indians born within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.48
3.

Reorganization Through Termination

The failures of the allotment era were reflected in a policy shift in the mid1920s. This shift was toward so-called “Indian Reorganization,” in which the
federal government sought to revitalize tribal governments, and tribes were
encouraged to engage in economic development.49 The general theme of Indian
Reorganization polices was similar to those of the New Deal era, encouraging
tribes to engage in nation-building by offering educational, technical, and
employment programs to tribal members.50 Though the impact on tribal selfgovernance during the Indian Reorganization era was “debatable,” and
widespread poverty persisted on reservations, Indian Reorganization policies did
prevent further loss of tribal lands.51
Whatever the gains of Indian Reorganization, it was short-lived. As the
United States emerged from the Second World War, social and economic forces
again forced a dramatic shift in Indian policy away from reorganization and selfgovernance toward assimilation of Native American Indians and termination of
tribal governments.52
The primary goal of termination policy was to end the trust relationship
between the federal government and the tribes, and ultimately subjugate Native
American Indians to U.S. federal, state, and local laws.53 As a practical matter,
“termination” meant dividing tribally controlled assets, namely land, among
individual tribal members and ceasing federal programs that assisted tribes with
education, health, welfare, housing, and other social needs.54
Another key feature of the termination era was expansion of the role of
state law and jurisdiction over Native American Indians. As the federal
government withdrew its assistance programs, state and local governments were
given broader authority over the individual Native American Indians whose

46. Id. § 1.04 & n.8.
47. Id. § 1.04 & nn.14–15, 25–31 (providing details on policies that forced educational and cultural
assimilation and how those policies failed).
48. Id. § 1.04 & nn.33–36 (history of Citizenship Act of 1924).
49. Id. § 1.05 & n.8 (discussing the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934).
50. Id. § 1.05 & nn.9–10. Criticism of the Indian Reorganization Act includes that it was paternalistic in
nature and forced tribes to organize according to norms of the federal government without true respect for tribal
sovereignty. Id. § 1.05 & nn.13–19.
51. Id. § 1.05 & nn.19–20.
52. Id. § 1.06 & n.7.
53. Id. § 1.06 & n.19.
54. Id. § 1.06 & nn.23–24.
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tribes had been terminated.55 Tribal law, including tribal tax laws, no longer
applied to terminated tribes, and state taxing authority was expanded.56 With the
termination of federal trust obligations and the corresponding expansion of state
authority, Native American Indians lost more land and experienced exacerbated
poverty.57
4.

The Current Era of Self-Determination

In the 1960s, federal policies with respect to tribes and their members
shifted again.58 The War on Poverty and new federalism took hold in broader
society and set the tone for similar recognition of the obligations of the federal
government with respect to tribes.59 Thus began the era of tribal selfdetermination and self-governance, which continues to this day.
The central idea of self-determination policy is that tribes should be “the
primary or basic governmental unit of Indian policy.”60 For example, the
National Congress of American Indians was established to help promote tribes’
ability to develop their “own programs” and “solve their own problems.”61 In
this era, tribes began to self-direct programs that were previously managed by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and to create structures for decision-making
and program administration at the tribal level.62
Policies of self-determination and self-governance live in the shadow of
allotment and termination, specifically in the economic development arena,
where land and inheritance issues are complicated by the ownership of land by
non-Indians.63 As the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has borne out, the
boundaries of tribal jurisdiction are somewhat circumscribed by land status. For
example, the checkerboard patterns of ownership within Indian reservations
limit tribal authority over land owned by non-Indians.64 To create workable
solutions between tribal, state, and local legal authorities, tribes and states have
used compacting to “develop[] and maintain mutually beneficial arrangements
. . . [which] have created strong mutual respect between Indian and non-Indian
professionals.”65

55. Id. § 1.06 & nn.24–25. For an example of the expansion of state jurisdiction, see Act of Aug. 15, 1953,
Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326; 28
U.S.C. § 1360); see also COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.06 n.27.
56. COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.06 & nn.24–25.
57. Id. § 1.06 & nn.15–32.
58. Id. § 1.07 & nn.2–16.
59. Id. § 1.07 & n.1.
60. Id. § 1.07 & nn.3–4.
61. Id. § 1.07 & n.13.
62. Id. § 1.07 & nn.15, 30.
63. Id. § 1.07 & nn.81–82.
64. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563–67 (1981); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,
532 U.S. 654, 659 (2001). The legacy of allotment as it impacts state taxation in Indian Country is discussed
infra Part I.B.2.c.
65. COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.07 & nn.91–93.
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B. MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL TAXATION IN INDIAN COUNTRY AND ITS IMPACT
ON TRIBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
A critical component of self-determination is economic self-sufficiency,
which leads tribes to purse economic development activities.66 Taxation plays a
critical role in tribes’ economic development. This Subpart provides background
on the relationship between taxation and economic development in Indian
Country, the law regarding the scope of various taxing sovereigns in Indian
Country, and the impact of state assertion of taxing authority on tribal economic
development.
1.

Relationship Between Taxation and Economic Development in
Indian Country

Taxation serves multiple purposes in society, but the most significant are
generating revenue to fund the cost of government and regulating behaviors or
economic activities.67 To generate governmental revenue, taxes can be imposed
on various activities and entities. Common types of taxes include taxes on
income, accumulated wealth or property holdings, and consumption activities.
The federal government relies heavily on income taxes and wealth taxes on large
estates.68 States, and derivatively local governments, rely on property tax
revenue and, depending on the state, income and/or consumption taxes.69
Tribes are in a particularly unique position with respect to income and
property taxes. As a practical matter, tribes do not impose income tax, because
they lack a sustainable tax base among their members.70 As a legal matter, tribes
cannot impose ad valorem property taxes upon land within the reservation that
is held in trust by the federal government.71 Accordingly, the remaining options

66. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Economic Development as a Substitute for Reservation
Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV. 759, 774–84 (2004) (explaining tribal economic development activities).
67. See Barsh, supra note 8, at 534–37. In addition to revenue raising for general governmental services
and regulatory purposes, taxes can also serve to redistribute wealth and facilitate fiscal stabilization. Id.
However, while wealth distribution policies may exist in tribal governments, wealth distribution is not usually
accomplished through taxation. See Pippa Browde, Tax Burdens and Tribal Sovereignty: The Prohibition on
Lavish and Extravagant Benefits Under the Tribal General Welfare Exclusion, 20 NEV. L.J. 651, 685–87 (2020)
(discussing tax-related issues for per capita distributions of tribal gaming proceeds).
68. The federal government derives most of its revenue from sources related to income, including
individual and corporate income taxes and employment-type taxes. WALTER HELLERSTEIN, KIRK J. STARK, JOHN
A. SWAIN & JOAN M. YOUNGMAN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 4–5 (11th ed. 2020).
69. See id. Unlike federal revenue sources (ninety percent of which are derived from income), there are at
least eighteen revenue sources for state and local taxes. Id. at 5. The three that generate the most revenue for
states are income, sales, and property taxes. Id. For subnational public finance, property taxes generate seventytwo percent of the revenue for local governments and only 1.7% of state revenue. Id. at 6. However, there is
“substantial” variation among the fifty states, and the defining characteristic of state taxation is diversity. Id. at
5.
70. Tribal Governance: Taxation, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, https://www.ncai.org/policy-issues/tribal
-governance/taxation (last visited Dec. 5, 2022); Fletcher, supra note 66, at 771–72, 772 nn.84–85.
71. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 316 (1819).
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for tribes are to use consumption taxes and/or severance taxes for the
development of natural resources.72
Another unique element of tribal taxation relates to the nature of tribal
economies themselves. Some economic development ventures in Indian Country
are run by the tribe or tribal entities as opposed to private actors within the
tribe.73 If the tribe itself is a market player in the economy, the tribe need not tax
itself.74 For economic ventures in Indian Country that involve nonmember
businesses or partnerships between tribes and nonmember entities, tribal
taxation remains an important piece of tribal economic development.75 As
explained further below, a major challenge for tribal economic development in
Indian Country is that states often also assert taxation in Indian Country, creating
problems of double, or juridical, taxation.76
A useful framework for understanding the relationship between taxation
and tribal economic development opportunities in Indian Country is to
categorize tribal economic development activities into two distinct types of
transactions.77 These two distinct categories, set forth below, are helpful to
analyze the utility of compacts and to provide a concrete understanding of how
tribal economic activities commonly operate. These categories are also useful to
understand the scope of the law governing state taxation over transactions within
Indian Country.
72. See infra Part I.B.2.b; see also Cowan, supra note 4, at 103–04 & nn.49–52 (providing examples of
how tribes use severance taxes or consumption taxes); Ansson, supra note 8, at 512–13 & nn.76–85 (referring
to the variety of severance and sales taxes used by the Absentee Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma).
73. The types of entities used by tribes are beyond the scope of this Article. For an overview of key issues
of doing business in Indian Country, including entity structures, see generally Michael P. O’Connell,
Fundamentals of Contracting by and with Indian Tribes, 3 AM. INDIAN L.J. 159 (2001). One commentator has
argued that tribes can avoid the reaches of state taxation in some cases by operating tribal enterprises. See Cowan,
supra note 4, at 132 & nn.204–09. Critics claim tribally controlled business enterprises represent socialist or
communist values, and they have cited market inefficiencies as an argument against them. See generally, e.g.,
Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism or Socialism Succeed?, 80 OR. L.
REV. 757 (2001). But see Fletcher, supra note 66, at 775–77 (explaining why the question of whether tribes are
socialist is a red herring). Indeed, the economic principles discussed in this Article assume a capitalist economic
system. This is not the only model. See STEPHANIE HUNTER MCMAHON, PRINCIPLES OF TAX POLICY 102 (2d ed.
2018) (noting that while the “governing model in much economic theory is an unfettered free market exchange,
long assumed to achieve an increase in societal wealth,” it is not universally accepted and has flaws). Tribalist
economic theory challenges some of the assumptions about capitalist, free-market economies. See Angelique A.
EagleWoman, Tribal Values of Taxation Within the Tribalist Economic Theory, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1,
2 (2008).
74. See Cowan, supra note 4, at 119 & n.139.
75. See id. at 99 (discussing the consequences of either choosing or foregoing taxation for a tribe); see also
Pippa Browde, From Zero-Sum to Economic Partners: Reframing State Tax Policies in Indian Country in the
Post-COVID Economy, 52 N.M. L. REV. 1, 29 (2022) (referring to the two sides of the economic development
“coin”).
76. See infra Part I.B.2.
77. To this Author’s knowledge, this particular categorization is novel, though similar delineations have
been made in the literature regarding the economic development activities of tribes. See Cowan, supra note 4,
at 118, 120 (distinguishing between tribally owned ventures versus outside contractors); see also Crepelle, supra
note 4, at 702–05 (discussing tribal business success such as gaming compared to struggles for private entity
development).
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The first category is where non-Indian customers purchase goods or
services from tribes or tribal enterprises within Indian Country. A state may
assert its sales tax on the non-Indian consumer or customer. This scenario is
referred to as “tribe as retailer.”
The second category is where the tribe, tribal entities, or tribal members
engage in commercial transactions with non-Indian businesses or investors in
Indian Country. The state may assert various business taxes, including income
or business-operations taxes, on the non-Indian business. This scenario is
referred to as “tribe as partner.”78
2.

The Law Regarding the Scope of Taxing Sovereigns in Indian
Country

Three sovereigns have, to varying degrees, taxing authority in Indian
Country: the tribe itself, the federal government, and state (and derivative local)
governments.79 Questions about the sovereigns’ taxing authority depend on
multiple variables, including the political status of the person or entity subject
to taxes and the ownership of the land on which the transaction occurs.80
The law regarding federal and tribal taxing authority is briefly described
below. State taxing authority in Indian Country is covered in greater depth,
because asserted state jurisdiction creates the juridical taxation problems
addressed by tax revenue compacts.

78. “Partner” is used in a non-legal sense here—the tribe is not necessarily engaging in a legal partnership
bound by principles of agency.
79. This Article attempts to distill principles as simply as possible, though the multiple types of law and
policy at issue are anything but simple. See Pomp, supra note 2, at 904–08 (internal citations omitted) (“Indian
taxation drags lawyers into areas outside their normal comfort zone. Practitioners need to master treaties between
the federal government and the tribes; state enabling acts; numerous Indian-specific statutes and executive orders
that often reflect polar swings in Congressional policy; special Indian canons of construction; the unique
patchwork pattern of land ownership on reservations; and concepts like ‘Indian sovereignty’ that serve as
ubiquitous, amorphous, and malleable backdrop in many cases.”). For brevity, I only refer to state government
authority to tax. For purposes of this Article, state government taxing authority also includes local governments
or sub-government authority under the state, such as counties or municipalities. The doctrine governing taxing
authority within Indian Country follows the contours and vacillations of Federal Indian policy over the course
of history. See supra Part I.A.
80. Political status generally refers to whether the individual or entity is deemed Indian under the law. See,
e.g., Rachel San Kronowitz, Joanne Lichtman, Steven Paul McSloy & Matthew G. Olsen, Toward Consent and
Cooperation: Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 507, 514–16
(1987); see also generally Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). It also depends on whether that
individual is a member of the governing tribe where a state tax is imposed. For example, if an individual who is
American Indian resides or transacts business within the territorial boundaries of a tribe of which they are not a
member, an otherwise valid state tax will also apply to the individual. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Rsrv., 447 U.S. 134, 160–61 (1980). For a critique of this law, see generally Scott A. Taylor, The
Unending Onslaught on Tribal Sovereignty: State Income Taxation of Non-Member Indians, 91 MARQ. L.
REV. 917 (2008). For an explanation on the allotment era and the focus on land status, see supra Part I.A.
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Federal Taxing Authority in Indian Country

As a general proposition, the federal government has taxing authority
within Indian Country.81 Indian tribes, like state governments and sub-national
units of government, are exempt from federal taxes.82 Individual Native
American Indians, however, are generally subject to federal income tax.83 There
are exceptions to that general rule for specific types of income derived from
restricted trust allotments and specified treaty or statutory rights, which are
exempt from the federal income tax.84
b.

Tribal Taxes in Indian Country

The power to tax is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty retained by
tribes, unless Congress specifically divests the tribe of such power.85 Tribes are
thus free to impose taxes on their members. Tribes are also free to impose taxes
over non-Indians transacting business in Indian Country.86 For example, tribes
may impose hotel occupancy taxes on tribal land within a reservation, sales taxes
on sales occurring on reservation land, and severance taxes on companies
extracting natural resources from reservation land.87 A tribe’s authority to tax is
81. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
82. Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55. The nature and limits of the federal exemptions are not entirely
clear, but exploration of such limits is beyond the scope of this Article.
83. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956). Individual Indians are subject to federal tax on income
derived from both tribal and non-tribal sources. Id. Federal estate and gift taxes also generally apply to individual
Native American Indians. COHEN, supra note 1, § 8.02[2][b]. There is some misconception that political status
as a member of an Indian tribe provides a blanket exemption from federal tax based on the constitutional
language that excluded “Indians not taxed,” for purposes of apportioning members of the House of
Representatives. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; id. amend. XXVI, § 1.
This language reflected the apportionment census and tax status of tribal members at the time of the drafting of
the Constitution. Id. In 1924, federal law granted citizenship to all non-citizen Indians born within the territorial
boundaries of the United States. Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)).
84. See Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, for an explanation of tax exemptions on income derived from
sources on land that are subject to restricted allotment and treaties. One such statutory exemption is § 7873 of
the Internal Revenue Code, which exempts individuals and tribal enterprises from federal income taxes derived
from tribal fishing rights. 26 U.S.C. § 7873 (2011); see Jensen, supra note 1, at 16–17 (“Whatever the inherent,
traditional power of tribes within their own country, it is now generally accepted that the federal government
has plenary power over the tribes.”). The perspective that tribal governments enjoy a diminished or quasisovereignty dominates Federal Indian law in judicial opinions and congressional actions. See Jensen, supra. A
more holistic perspective of sovereignty—specifically that tribes have the “full bundle” of sovereign powers—
is another perspective that differs from the constrained Federal Indian law perspective. See EagleWoman, supra
note 73, at 2.
85. Colville, 447 U.S. at 152; see COHEN, supra note 1, § 8.04[1].
86. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982). The rule on general regulatory authority
over nonmembers doing business within Indian Country comes from the seminal case, Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544 (1981), decided the year before Merrion. “A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members,
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.” Montana, 455 U.S. at 565. This is known
as the first Montana exception to a general rule that tribes lack authority over nonmembers.
87. Colville, 447 U.S. at 152 (upholding tribal excise tax on purchase of cigarettes by non-Indians);
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 143–44 (upholding tribal severance tax imposed on a non-Indian extraction company
drilling for oil and gas on reservation land).
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generally limited to the geographic confines of tribal land and may not extend
to businesses run by non-Indians on land held in fee by non-Indians.88
c.

State Taxation in Indian Country

As a matter of basic U.S. constitutional law, state governments generally
have the authority to tax persons and property within their geographic
boundaries.89 Indian tribes, though geographically located within a state, are
sovereign governments that are not subject to general state laws, including laws
imposing state taxation.90 The rule that state tax laws do not apply within Indian
Country is not absolute—the inquiry turns on who bears the legal incidence of
the tax, whether the tax infringes on tribal self-government, and whether federal
law preempts the state tax.91
As an initial matter, if the legal incidence of a state tax imposed in Indian
Country falls on a tribe or its members, absent a federal statute permitting such
taxation, the state tax will not apply.92 Legal incidence exists when a person or
party is legally obligated to pay the tax, and it is determined by a formalistic
inquiry into the language of the taxing statute.93 In its interpretation of this rule,
the Supreme Court has invalidated state fuel taxes assessed on fuel sold by a
tribal business operated on a reservation,94 state taxes on royalties earned by a
88. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 653, 659 (2001) (holding that the Navajo Nation lacked
power to impose hotel tax on land owned in fee within the border of the reservation).
89. States retain the powers neither delegated to the federal government nor expressly prohibited by the
U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. Note that some commentary on federalist structure argues that
the law, as it developed, is wrong. For example, Professor Pomp argues that the development of the law giving
power to states to impose taxes in Indian Country did not reflect the intent of the Constitution’s framers. Pomp,
supra note 2, at 910 (“The Court has emasculated and denigrated the Indian Commerce Clause, preventing
implementation of the Founders’ vision.”).
90. For a thorough discussion on limits of state power over tribal governments and their members within
Indian Country, see COHEN, supra note 1, § 6.01[1]–[2]. The application of this rule to matters of state taxation
is articulated in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251,
258 (1992).
91. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995) (legal incidence test); Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217 (1959) (infringement on tribal sovereignty test); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U.S. 136 (1980) (preemption balancing test).
92. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 458 (“The initial and frequently dispositive question in Indian tax cases
. . . is who bears the legal incidence of a tax.”). Congressional authorization for state taxation of tribes or tribal
members must be express and unmistakably clear. Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976). Cases in
which federal statutes permit state taxation in Indian Country are beyond the scope of this Article.
93. Legal incidence is often referred to as “statutory incidence.” Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax
Incidence 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 8829, 2002). For a brief explanation of the
distinctions between the party who is legally obligated to pay a tax and the party or parties who bear the economic
cost or burden of the tax, see MCMAHON, supra note 73, at 120. How the economic realities of a tax play out is
a complicated question. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE
DEBATE OVER TAXES 111 (5th ed. 2017). “For any given tax, the true incidence is difficult to determine precisely,
and for some taxes there is still substantial disagreement among economists about what the truth is.” Id. at 113.
The emphasis on legal incidence has been subject to critique. See, e.g., Pomp, supra note 2, at 1195 (quoting
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)) (criticizing the Court’s formalistic legal
incidence rule as having “no relationship to economic realities” and presenting “a trap for the unwary
draftsman”).
94. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 453.
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tribal member for leasing property on a reservation,95 state cigarette and motor
vehicle taxes imposed on a tribal member,96 and state income taxes imposed on
a tribal member’s income that was sourced entirely on the reservation where the
tribal member lived and worked.97 However, a state tax of which the legal
incidence falls on a tribe or individual Native American Indian may be upheld
if the taxed activity did not occur within Indian Country.98
If the legal incidence of a state tax falls on non-Indians or nonmember
Indians within Indian Country, then the question of the state tax’s validity is
more vexing. Generally, the rule is that states may impose a nondiscriminatory
tax unless the tax infringes on tribal self-government99 or Congress has
preempted the tax.100 The infringement test, which was first articulated by the
Supreme Court in 1959 and derives from notions of tribal sovereignty, has rarely
been applied to resolve the issue of validity.101 The Court has noted the trend
away from infringement analysis and toward preemption analysis in determining
a tax’s validity.102
Federal preemption of state taxation is not limited to cases of express
congressional preemption.103 If a state tax violates federal law, as determined by
“a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests
at stake,” then the tax is preempted.104 The “particularized inquiry” analysis is
like a balancing test that weighs the extent of federal regulation and control of
the activity the state seeks to tax against the regulatory and revenue-raising
interests of states and tribes and the provision of state or tribal services.105
Preemption jurisprudence regarding the validity of state taxes imposed in Indian
Country on non-Indians yields unpredictable results.106
Courts have applied the preemption analysis in a variety of contexts. It has
played out slightly differently in cases where the tribe is a retailer as compared
to when the tribe is acting as a partner.

95. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 768 (1985).
96. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 469, 480–81 (1976).
97. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973).
98. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 156 (1973).
99. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
100. Moe, 425 U.S. at 483.
101. See generally Williams, 358 U.S. 217 (setting forth the infringement test).
102. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172.
103. Cotton Petrol. Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176–77 (1989).
104. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980). Though the law makes no explicit
taxonomical distinctions between the two types of scenarios posited here, the tests for preemption are slightly
different for state taxation when tribes are acting as retailers versus when tribes are acting as partners. See id. at
141–43, 150–53.
105. Id. at 150–51.
106. The law has been more thoroughly explained elsewhere in the literature. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note
1, at 55–84 (discussing preemption and state power to tax within Indian Country); Cowan, supra note 4, at 143–
49 (addressing preemption and accompanying problems). This Article is not intended to serve as a critique of
the law, but rather as a basis for understanding why compacting is favorable for states and tribes.
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In the tribe-as-retailer scenario, tribal revenue-raising interests are most
likely to outweigh state interests when the revenue from the tax is “derived from
value generated on the reservation by activities involving the [t]ribes[,] and
when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services.”107 In Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, the Supreme Court
upheld state excise taxes imposed on sales of cigarettes by tribal retailers to nonIndians on a reservation.108 In balancing the state, federal, and tribal interests,
the Court found that the tribe had no special claim to tax revenue generated from
the sales of cigarettes, because the value of the cigarettes was not generated by
the tribe or created on the reservation.109
Levying state taxes over tribes and tribal enterprises engaged in retailing is
a complicated matter. Given such complexity, the Supreme Court has said that
a state can require a tribe to maintain detailed records to prove which sales are
exempt from state taxes.110 How a state can enforce the collecting and
recordkeeping requirements may be limited by the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity.111
In the tribe-as-partner scenario, the Court has applied the preemption
balancing test, articulated in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,112 in
ways that have arrived at seemingly absurd results. In White Mountain Apache,
the Court invalidated state taxes imposed on a non-Indian logging company
engaged in business on tribal land, reasoning that state taxation would
undermine the pervasive federal regulatory scheme over logging in Indian
Country.113 The Court concluded that, because the federal government and tribe
had constructed, maintained, and policed the roads used by the logging
company, the state’s interest in logging or maintaining the roads was minimal to
nonexistent.114
Nine years later, in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, the Court
considered a similar set of facts but reached the opposite conclusion regarding
the state’s ability to tax a non-Indian business within Indian Country.115 In
Cotton Petroleum, the Court upheld state severance taxes on the production of

107. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Rsrv., 447 U.S. 134, 156–57 (1980). Cf. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 37 F.3d 430 (9th Cir. 1994). In Cabazon, the tribe constructed and operated
betting facilities, and the court distinguished the tribe’s venture from those that were “merely serving as a conduit
for the products of others.” Id. at 435.
108. 447 U.S. at 154–57. Colville is also discussed above, as it stands for the proposition that tribes can
impose tribal taxes on non-Indians in Indian Country. Id. at 152–54.
109. Id. at 156–57. The outcome of this case led the Squaxin Island Tribe to market its own cigarette brand
that was manufactured on tribal lands, immunizing the tribal retail sales from state taxation entirely. See Fletcher,
supra note 66, at 789 & n.197.
110. Colville, 447 U.S. at 160.
111. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 514 (1991).
112. 448 U.S. 136 (1991).
113. Id. at 149.
114. Id. at 148–50.
115. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
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oil and gas by non-Indian lessees within Indian Country.116 Like the federally
regulated logging industry in White Mountain Apache, the extraction of oil and
gas in Indian Country was subject to pervasive federal regulation, under the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1938.117 The non-Indian extraction company argued that
the state’s tax was inconsistent with the federal policies of tribal selfdetermination.118 Minimizing the importance of tribal sovereignty, the Court
upheld the state tax, relying on the finding that the state provided “substantial
services” to both the tribe and the non-Indian taxpayer,119 and determining that
the impact of the tax on tribal or federal interests was “too indirect and too
insubstantial.”120
It is easier to predict whether courts will uphold a state tax imposed on nonIndian consumers purchasing from tribal retailers than whether courts will
uphold a state tax imposed on transactions in which the tribe is acting as partner.
When it comes to tribes acting as partners with non-Indian businesses engaging
in economic activity in Indian Country, the validity of a state tax can be highly
uncertain.
3.

Impacts of Juridical Taxation on Tribal Economic Development
Opportunities

The scope of actual or potential state taxation in Indian Country impacts
economic development choices and opportunities for tribal governments. Legal
uncertainty surrounds both types of transactions in Indian Country—tribe as
retailer and tribe as partner—forcing tribes to make choices about potential
litigation or cessions of taxing authority. The impact of state taxation on tribes’
economic development is discussed below in relation to both types of
transactions.
First, with respect to economic development opportunities for tribes acting
as retailers, the law does not allow a tribe to “market a tax exemption” from state
taxation as a means of attracting consumers.121 Absent unique value created or
116. Id. at 175, 186.
117. Id. at 167; 25 U.S.C. § 396a et seq.
118. Cotton Petrol., 490 U.S. at 176–77.
119. Id. at 185.
120. Id. at 187. The result in Cotton Petroleum was also surprising because the Supreme Court appeared to
change course with respect to whether the Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 permitted state taxation. Id. at 182–83,
183 n.14. In a footnote, the Court denied that the result was inconsistent from past cases. Id. at 183 n.14.
However, in a prior case, Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, the Court interpreted the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1938 and its predecessor act to hold that because the 1938 law did not expressly permit state taxation, the
Court would not infer state taxing authority. 471 U.S. 759, 766–67 (1985).
121. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. Arizona, 50 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 1995) (“When state
taxes are imposed on the sale of non-Indian products to non-Indians, [such] as . . . in the so-called ‘smoke shop’
cases, the preemption balance tips toward state interests.”); see also Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Rsrv., 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980) (“We do not believe that principles of Federal Indian law, whether
stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal self-government, or otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market an
exemption from state taxation to persons who would normally do their business elsewhere.”). For a critique of
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added by the tribe to the goods sold, the same retail transaction involving a nonIndian customer may be subject to a state retail sales or excise tax.122 As a legal
matter, the tribe may still assert its own retail or excise taxes.123 But as an
economic matter, non-Indian consumers will not choose to bear the economic
cost of both the tribe’s and state’s tax, and will instead purchase goods or
services off-reservation.124
Second, in scenarios where a non-Indian business is engaged in
transactions with the tribe as a partner, actual or potential state taxation on the
non-Indian business can chill outside investment.125 The complexity and
inconsistent results in the case law creates an uncertain landscape for businesses
interested in engaging in ventures in Indian Country but concerned about tax
consequences.
Where a state has the ability to tax a transaction in Indian Country, outside
investors and businesses may choose not to engage with tribes as partners, given
that they can be taxed by both the state and the tribal entity.126 As a practical
matter, a tribe must then decide between taxing the business entity to raise
revenue and encourage economic development or foregoing the tax in the hopes
that a lower tax burden will encourage investment from outside businesses.
Accordingly, juridical taxation in Indian Country creates results
inconsistent with Federal Indian policy intended to foster a tribe’s ability to
promote self-government through tribal self-determination.127
C. COMPACTS AS A SOLUTION TO THE DOUBLE TAX PROBLEM
Given the state of the law regarding state taxation in Indian Country, states
and tribes have turned to other mechanisms to resolve disputes over tax
consequences.128 One collaborative solution is for tribes and states to enter into
Colville in denying tribes primacy in imposing consumption taxes on sales to non-Indians, see Fletcher, supra
note 66, 787–89, 787 n.188 (discrediting state arguments in favor of “[l]eveling the playing field” as a pretext
for states competing with tribal sales tax revenue).
122. Colville, 447 U.S. at 155 (concluding that the Tribe did not create value in cigarettes marketed). Courts
have repeatedly upheld state taxes over tribal sales of cigarettes on the grounds that the cigarettes were not
created by the tribe or from reservation resources. See, e.g., Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros.,
512 U.S. 61, 61, 76 (1994); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976). The test
articulated in Colville has not been developed in further case law, and at least one commentator has noted that
the test “probably cannot bear the weight it is being asked to carry.” Pomp, supra note 2, at 1219.
123. Colville, 447 U.S. at 152–53.
124. Id. at 154 (noting that tribes will be at a competitive disadvantage because combined tribal and state
taxes on sales of cigarettes to non-Indians will be higher).
125. See Crepelle, supra note 4, at 725 (“State taxes absolutely kill private investment in Indian Country.”).
126. One tribal leader referred to the culmination of factors, including the potential for double tax, lack of
infrastructure, and uncertain tribal commercial law, as the “Indian differential” that diminishes a tribe’s ability
to attract investment. Cowan, supra note 4, at 95 & n.13.
127. Id. at 99 (“In light of the double tax problem, these seemingly coherent and compatible goals can be at
odds with one another ¾ to the point of looking mutually exclusive.”).
128. There is a significant body of literature calling courts to resolve the double tax problem. See Pomp,
supra note 2, at 1220; Taylor, supra note 8, at 890. Alternatively, Congress could provide a federal solution. See
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intergovernmental agreements, referred to as compacts, which resolve the issues
that arise from the state asserting taxing authority in Indian Country. This
Subpart first provides some necessary general background on what tribal-state
compacts are and how they operate as both a sacrifice and expression of
sovereignty. It then provides specific examples of existing compacts between
states and tribes in both categories of transactions, tribe as retailer and tribe as
partner, to detail how tribal-state compacts operate.
1.

General Background on Tribal-State Compacts

Compacts are “working agreements between tribes and states that resolve
jurisdictional or substantive disputes and recognize each entity’s
sovereignty.”129 Compacts are like super-contracts. While contracts and
compacts both address specific problems or transactions, contracts generally do
not address jurisdictional legal issues or entitlements between sovereigns.130
Furthermore, compacts are viewed as more binding than contracts.131 The use of
the term compact as opposed to a mere contract also represents that the
transacting parties are sovereign entities, engaging in intergovernmental
agreements.132
In all areas of the law, compacting is both an expression and concession of
sovereignty. It is an expression of sovereignty, because the compacting
sovereign has the power to enter the agreement in the first place. But it is also a
concession of sovereignty, because the compacting sovereign is giving up
control.
State authority to engage in compacting with tribes varies by state, but most
states have some enabling legislation that specifically allows state actors to
negotiate and compact with tribes.133 These statutes come in various forms,
including statements of policy “encouraging cooperation,” such as in Montana

Cowan, supra note 4, at 97. States could step in and provide a solution, as well. See Browde, supra note 75, at
25–30.
129. Intergovernmental Compacts, supra note 15, at 922.
130. Id. at 924.
131. Id.
132. See id. (“Compacts differ from ordinary contracts because they may be more enforceable, and because
contracts, unlike compacts, do not normally resolve issues of legal entitlement or jurisdiction between sovereign
entities, but merely provide closure for a specific problem. Compacts are more closely related to treaties.”).
133. See Getches, supra note 15, at 147 (“Absent some particular aspect of state law that would make such
legislation necessary, states appear to have the power to negotiate such agreements whether or not they are
specifically authorized by state legislation.”). Tribal-state agreements generally do not need to be sanctioned by
the federal government. Id. at 145 (“Neither federal permission nor federal approval is generally required for
interjurisdictional agreements.”). The federal government must approve compacts that involve more than one
state. See id.; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3. Because of the trust relationship between the federal government
and Indian Nations, any agreement that would involve “attempts to alienate Indian property or other Indian
rights” would require congressional approval unless otherwise delegated to the Secretary of the Interior. Getches,
supra, at 145.
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and Nebraska.134 Other such laws grant specific authority to negotiate certain
types of taxes, such as cigarette or other excise taxes.135 Still other statutes
approve and incorporate tax compacts with tribes as a matter of state statutory
law.136
Just as there is a variety of enabling legislation, so also do the types of
compacts between tribes and states encompass a variety of legal jurisdictional
issues. Forty years ago, the Commission on State-Tribal Relations surveyed
compacts between tribes and states in five substantive areas of law: “law
enforcement, tax collection, natural resources, social services, and general
government activities.”137 Compacts have been used in many legal contexts to
address conflicting state and tribal laws, including “wildlife management,
environmental protection, education, social services, taxation, and law
enforcement.”138
Compacts largely exist to resolve conflicts of law.139 A unique aspect of
tribal-state tax revenue compacts is that they resolve an economic, not legal,
problem.140 Where both the tribe and the state assert authority to tax the same

134. See State-Tribal Cooperative Agreements Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-11-101 (West 2022); StateTribal Cooperative Agreements Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1501 to -1509 (2022); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 42-3308 (2014); FLA. STAT. § 285.710(8)(a) (2022); IOWA CODE ANN. § 421.47 (West 2011); State
Tribal Relations Act, IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 67-4001 to -4003 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 205.30c
(West 2013); MINN. STAT. § 270C.19 (2021); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 9-11-12.1 (West 2021) (governing New
Mexico tribal cooperative agreements generally); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 9-11-12.2 (West 2022) (authorizing New
Mexico cooperative agreements with the Navajo Nation specifically); N.Y. EXEC. L. § 12 (Consol. 2022); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 68, § 500.63 (2022); OR. REV. STAT. § 323.401 (2021) (governing refund agreements between Oregon
and tribal governments); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 10-12A-1 to -9 (West 2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.450
(2019) (addressing Washington state cigarette tax compacts); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.490 (2022) (governing
Washington marijuana tax agreements); WASH. REV. CODE § 82.38.310 (2022) (governing Washington fuel tax
agreements); WIS. STAT. § 139.325 (2022) (Wisconsin agreements with Indian tribes); WIS. STAT. § 139.323
(2022) (regarding refunds of Wisconsin taxes to Indian tribes).
135. See MINN. STAT. § 270C.19 (2022) (authorizing the state of Minnesota to enter tax refund agreements
on sales, use, and excise taxes); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-3308 (2018) (authorizing the state of Arizona to
collect and administer tribal taxes after compacting with tribes to coordinate tobacco tax administration).
136. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2986 (2022) (approving a tobacco sales tax compact between Kansas and
the Kickapoo Tribe of Kansas); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-61-102 (2018) (approving and incorporating into state
law a tax compact between Colorado and the Southern Ute Indian Tribe).
137. COMMISSION ON STATE-TRIBAL RELATIONS, supra note 15, at 5; see id. at 1–2 (explaining that the
Commission on State-Tribal Relations was created in response to a rising sense of antagonism and suspicion
between states and tribes regarding jurisdictional questions in Indian Country).
138. Getches, supra note 15, at 150–51. Professor Getches used the examples of compacts to argue that
tribes were negotiating sovereignty, and that such examples could be utilized as models to promote sovereignty
among first nations in Canada. Id.
139. Compacts between tribes and states in non-tax contexts, such as environmental law, often involve a
conflict of law problem. See id. at 121–22. For example, a tribe may be more stringent on environmental
regulation of pollutants than a state, or vice versa. In that example, both the state’s and tribe’s laws cannot apply,
because they are inconsistent. See id. at 151–60 (providing specific examples of compacts that resolve hunting
and fishing licensing conflicts, zoning and land-use regulation, law enforcement, and water law disputes).
140. This is not a claim of tax exceptionalism. The law over state regulatory authority in Indian Country
creates a different conflict problem with respect to taxation as compared to other state civil regulatory authority.
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transaction, both tribal and state taxation can apply, as a legal matter.141 Because
imposing both state and tribal taxation increases the total tax cost of the
transaction, as an economic and practical matter, the transacting parties will
simply not engage in the transaction in Indian Country.142 Compacts between
tribes and states as to taxing authority are thus borne of practical, not legal,
necessity.143
2.

Key Components of Tax Revenue Compacts

Many tribal-state tax revenue compacts share common elements. For
example, many of the non-substantive provisions of tax compacts are similar to
other intergovernmental agreements not specific to tax. All tax revenue
compacts also contain substantive provisions that resolve or address juridical
taxation, tax enforcement, or both between sovereigns. Examples of provisions
are provided below; however, a caveat is warranted here. Despite some basic
similarities, there is still tremendous variation among tax revenue compacts,
because they are negotiated between states and individual tribes.144
a.

Common Non-Substantive Provisions in Tax Revenue Compacts

Tax revenue compacts contain several general (non-substantive) provisions
that are similar to many intergovernmental agreements between tribes and states.
Common non-substantive provisions identify the parties, refer to the sovereignty
of the tribe and the law granting the state authority to enter the compact, define
terms, refer to existing substantive state or tribal tax laws or ordinances, and

141. This is different than, for example, a water quality regulation that differs between the state and tribal
regulation, where both laws cannot apply. See supra Part I.B.2.
142. This is the double bind that forces a tribe to choose between tax revenue and the economic development
activities themselves. See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the double bind of juridical taxation); see also Cowan,
supra note 4, at 118–23 (exploring double taxation as it affects tribes that run commercial ventures and tribes
that develop natural resources).
143. Professor Pomp notes that courts have been relatively indifferent to the problems of double taxation.
See Pomp, supra note 8, at 1220. Professor Pomp also notes that the issue has not been briefed with strong
evidentiary support, and that perhaps courts would respond if there were more factual development on this issue.
Id.
144. This caveat has been repeated in this Article and is an important and humbling aspect of Federal Indian
law. See generally Mark J. Cowan, State-Tribal Tax Compacts: Stories Told and Untold, CTR. FOR INDIAN
COUNTRY DEV.: POL’Y DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minn.), Sept.
2021, at 1. Indeed, the only thread of consistency is that the unique nature of each individual tribe and, to some
degree, the unique attributes of various states and the types of taxes imposed, lead to varied and diverse
compacts. Id. at 11–13. The number of existing compacts itself is not known. Many sources state that nationwide,
more than 200 tribes have entered into compacts with eighteen states. Tax Fairness and Tax Base Protection:
Hearings on H.R. 1168 Before the H. Comm. on Resources, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of W. Ron Allen,
President, National Congress of American Indians). As Professor Cowan notes, this data is twenty-five years old
and has not been updated. See Cowan, supra, at 13 n.29.
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provide for administrative issues such as enforcement, termination, and dispute
resolution.145
The parties to the agreement are usually a state, local government, or
branch of the state government and the compacting tribal nation or branch of
tribal government.146 Compacts provide the authority the state has to enter the
agreement.147 They usually articulate the goal or purpose of the
intergovernmental agreement, which is often to resolve the potential
consequences of juridical taxation.148 Compacts also expressly state which
particular tax or taxes are subject to the agreement.149 In specifying which taxes
are subject to the agreement, many compacts address the fact that the terms only
apply to the narrow slice of transactions for which states have actual or potential
taxing authority, such as when the legal incidence of the tax falls on non-Indian

145. There are thorough descriptions of the common provisions in compacts and the functions they serve.
See Cowan, supra note 144, at 13. Professor Cowan explores the fact that not all compacts acknowledge the
sovereignty of tribes. Id. at 24. He argues that the sovereignty of tribes should be “constantly acknowledged,”
given the history of fluctuating policies by the federal government regarding tribal sovereignty. Id. As discussed
later in this Article, the compact itself is both an expression of tribal sovereignty and a cession of sovereignty to
the extent by which the terms and practical realities require a tribe to cede taxing authority and revenue streams.
See infra Part II.
146. See, e.g., Fort Peck Tribes and State of Montana Oil and Natural Gas Production Tax Agreement, § I,
Mar. 25, 2008, https://mtrevenue.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Fort-Peck-Tribes-Montana-Oil-and-NaturalGas-Production-Tax-Agreement-2008-03-25.pdf [hereinafter Fort Peck Tribes Agreement] (identifying the
parties as the state of Montana and the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation); Marijuana
Compact Between the Suquamish Tribe and the State of Washington, § II, Sept. 15, 2015, https://lcb.wa.gov
/publications/Cannabis/Compact-9-14-15.pdf [hereinafter Suquamish Tribe Agreement] (identifying the parties
as the Suquamish Tribe and recognizing the authority of the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board to
negotiate the terms of the agreement); Cooperative Agreement Between New Mexico Taxation and Revenue
Department and Santa Fe Indian School, Inc., Recitals, Sept. 29, 2010, https://klvg4oyd4j.execute-api.us-west2.amazonaws.com/prod/PublicFiles/34821a9573ca43e7b06dfad20f5183fd/37b08e9d-3e50-4da9-87a5-85628a
890450/SF%20Indian%20School,%20Inc.%20&%20NM%20Taxation%20and%20Revenue%20Department.p
df [hereinafter Santa Fe Indian School Agreement] (identifying the compacting parties as the New Mexico
Department of Revenue on behalf of the state and the Santa Fe Indian School, Inc., a nonprofit designated to act
on behalf of the Nineteen Indian Pueblos).
147. See supra Part I.C.1.
148. See Cowan, supra note 144, at 13–14; see also Fort Peck Tribes Agreement, supra note 146, § II (“The
purposes of this Agreement are (1) to avoid dual taxation of new oil and gas production . . . ; (2) to ensure that
the same level of taxation is imposed on new production of oil and natural gas both within and outside the
boundaries of the Reservation; and (3) to avoid legal controversy regarding the taxation of new oil and natural
gas production . . . .”).
149. Professor Cowan uses ten tax agreements to show the variety of taxes for which compacts are
negotiated. See Cowan, supra note 144, at 15–23 (outlining compacts over excise taxes (fuel, tobacco,
marijuana), severance taxes (oil and gas), and multi-tax (sales, property)). Compacts address a variety of taxes,
and it is helpful to distinguish between the sales or consumption-type taxes that apply in transactions where the
tribe is a retailer, and the severance or business-profits type of taxes that apply in transactions where the tribe is
a partner. This distinction is important in fleshing out the incentives of the compacting parties. See infra Part
II.A.
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parties.150 Some compacts only address administrative issues, such as collection
and enforcement between sovereigns.151
The definition of terms usually specifies the geographic location over
which the tribe and state both assert taxing authority.152 Though not often a
disputed matter, the territorial boundaries and jurisdiction of a tribe can be a
contentious issue, a reminder of the legacy of the policies of allotment and
termination.153 Tax compacts also usually provide explicit recitals regarding the
compacting parties’ sovereign immunity.154
b.

Common Substantive Provisions in Tax Revenue Compacts

The substantive issues in tribal-state tax compacts depend on whether the
agreement addresses juridical taxation or tax enforcement and administration
issues, though many compacts address both.155
A key feature of compacts that addresses juridical taxation is the inclusion
of terms that specify a single applicable rate of taxation for transactions in Indian
Country. “The applicable rate” clause or terms can eliminate juridical tax in a
variety of ways. For example, if the agreement between a tribe and state is that
a single layer of taxation at an agreed rate should apply to a given transaction,
there are three ways that can be achieved. First, a compact can specify the state
150. See supra Part I.B.
151. See Cooperative Agreement Between the Jicarilla Apache Revenue and Taxation Department and the
Taxation and Revenue Department of the State of New Mexico Regarding the Gross Receipts Tax, § 1, Dec. 28,
2004, https://klvg4oyd4j.execute-api.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/prod/PublicFiles/34821a9573ca43e7b06dfad2
0f5183fd/b86127cf-f28f-4102-80f2-b29cf749e37d/Jicarilla%20Apache%20Nation%20and%20NM%20
Taxation%20and%20Revenue%20Department.pdf (“The [purpose of] . . . this Agreement . . . [is] to provide for
the exchange of information and the reciprocal, joint or common enforcement, administration, collection,
remittance and audit of gross receipts taxes of the party’s jurisdictions.”).
152. See Fort Peck Tribes Agreement, supra note 146, § II(B) (“This Agreement is limited to the taxation
of new oil and natural gas production from producers on the Reservation over whom both the State and the
Tribes each assert taxation authority, recognized as follows: (1) nonmember producers on trust land; (2)
nonmember producers on tribally owned fee lands; (3) nonmember producers on member trust allotments; (4)
nonmember producers on member-owned fee land; (5) nonmember producers on fee lands of nonmembers, if
the mineral estate is owned by the Tribes or by its members; and (6) nonmember producers outside the exterior
boundaries.”).
153. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Power To Tax, the Power To Destroy, and the Michigan Tribal-State
Tax Agreements, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 19 (2004) (noting the unique problems in Michigan that stem
from the fact that “most Michigan Tribes’ reservation boundaries are either unknown or unrecognized by the
State”). In compacts between the state of Michigan and the tribal nations located within it, the definition and
delineation of Indian Country becomes a substantive issue for debate. Id. at 44. The compact as to the reservation
boundaries in and of itself has prevented litigation. Id.
154. See Fort Peck Tribes Agreement, supra note 146, § XIV (noting state immunity from actions in tribal
court and granting the Tribe a limited waiver of sovereign immunity); id. § XXI(B) (stating that no rights,
arguments, or defenses are waived unless expressly stated).
155. To distinguish between the provisions as “substantive” and “non-substantive” is a bit misleading,
especially for those used to what is traditionally substantive tax law versus procedural tax law. For purposes of
this Article, substantive tax law refers to the tax itself, such as which jurisdiction’s tax applies to a transaction
in Indian Country and at what rate. Procedural tax law refers to questions of enforcement or tax administration,
such as which authority has administrative obligations of reporting, collecting, and remitting taxes. Furthermore,
the problem of juridical taxation has at its core a procedural dimension, since multi-jurisdictional taxation is
about how a sovereign can impose its taxing authority on inter-sovereign transactions.
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rate of taxation over a transaction, allowing the state tax to override tribal
taxation of the transaction.156 Second, a compact can specify the opposite—that
the tribal tax be imposed at the same rate as the state, and that the state exempt
the transaction from taxation.157 Third, a compact can create a combination of
lower state and tribal taxes to equal the agreed amount.158 That amount is usually
the state rate that would generally apply outside of Indian Country.
Some compacts specify a minimum rate as a floor but do not cap a
maximum rate, allowing a tribe to increase the rate of tax imposed within its
jurisdiction if desired.159 If a tribe does impose a rate greater than the state rate,
the juridical tax is eliminated, but the tribe creates a situation where the higher
tax rate discourages consumption. For example, if a tribe imposes a higher sales
tax than that outside of Indian Country, consumers will likely shop outside of
Indian Country.
In addition to addressing juridical taxation, compacts also allocate revenue
in the “sharing” portion of the agreement. Revenue allocation can be achieved
through the following mechanisms. First, compacts can be all-or-nothing
propositions, where either the state or the tribe is entitled to all the tax revenue
generated by the transactions occurring in Indian Country.160 According to some
compacts, the parties may share the revenue based on a percentage161 or a “per
156. See Tax Agreement Between the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians and the State of Michigan,
§ III(B)–(C), Dec. 30, 2002, https://www.michigan.gov/documents/LTRB_Agreement_5819-1_with_appendix
_88260_7.pdf (agreeing that the state rate applies unless the Tribe enacts a general sales tax rate at least equal
to the state rate, at which point the tribal tax applies and the state exempts the transactions).
157. See DOUGLAS B.L. ENDRESON, RESOLVING TRIBAL-STATE TAX CONFLICTS 15 (1991) (discussing the
Tax Agreement Between the State of Louisiana and the Chitimacha Tribe, which exempts state sales and excise
taxes on tobacco sold on the Chitimacha Reservation from state tobacco sales in exchange for the Tribe agreeing
to purchase from Louisiana wholesalers and impose tribal taxes at the same rate as the state).
158. See generally Intergovernmental Agreement Between State Tax Commission of Utah and Office of the
Navajo Tax Commission, at 3, Oct. 16, 2000, https://sct.narf.org/documents/richardsvpbp/TRIBAL-STATE
%20FUEL%20TAX%20AGREEMENTS/NAVAJO%20NATION-UTAH%20AGREEMENT.pdf (agreeing to
impose a combined fuel tax of $0.245 per gallon on fuel sales to non-Indians and nonmembers within the Navajo
Nation, with $0.18 attributable to Navajo Nation tribal tax and $0.065 attributable to Utah tax).
159. See ENDRESON, supra note 157, at 16 (discussing how the State of Nevada and Reno Sparks Tribe Tax
Agreement provides that the Tribe will impose excise tax on the sale of cigarettes and sales tax on tangible
personal property at least equal to, but no greater than, state tax rates, and that the Tribe will not price cigarettes
less than the state wholesale rate to create a competitive price advantage).
160. There are many examples of compacts where the tribe retains all revenue or is entitled to all revenue
generated by on-reservation transactions. See, e.g., Suquamish Tribe Agreement, supra note 146, § V(F);
Compact Relating to Cigarette and Tobacco Sales and Taxation, Iowa Tribe of Kan. & Neb.-State of Kan., art.
II, Feb. 22, 2016, https://ag.ks.gov/docs/default-source/documents/2016-2-22-compact---iowa-tribe-signed.pdf
?sfvrsn=2 [hereinafter Iowa Tribe Compact] (allocating all excise tax revenue from the sale of tobacco by the
Tribe to non-Indians to the Tribe, and the Tribe agreeing to stamp requirements for tobacco); Cannabis
Agreement Between Elko Band Colony of the Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone Indians of Nevada and the
State of Nevada, § V(E), Jan. 23, 2020, https://ag.ks.gov/docs/default-source/documents/2016-2-22-compact--iowa-tribe-signed.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (prohibiting the collection of state tax relating to cannabis products sold or
purchased by the Tribe, provided that the tax rate is at least equal to the state tax).
161. See Fort Peck Tribes Agreement, supra note 146, § VIII (allocating fifty percent of the tax revenues
covered by the Agreement to the Tribe); see also Agreement for the Collection and Dissemination of Motor
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capita” allocation based on population.162 Other compacts contain a more
complex formula.163 For example, Michigan and seven of the twelve federally
recognized Indian tribes located within the state negotiated tax agreements that
are substantially the same.164 The terms in those compacts regarding sales taxes
allocate sales tax revenues between the compacting tribe and state by
percentages.165 The size of these percentages depends on the annual gross
receipts of sales, and whether the tribe itself has its own sales tax or is just
enforcing the state tax.166 If the tribe has its own sales tax with a rate at least as
high as the state sales tax, the tribe is entitled to retain two-thirds of the revenue
on the first $5 million of annual gross receipts and remits one-third of the
revenue to the state.167 The tribe and state agree to split revenue in excess of the
$5 million threshold equally.168 If the tribe does not have its own sales tax, the
tribe and state agree to the same sharing terms; however, the tribe must remit the
collected tax on applicable transactions, and the state will pay the tribe.169 Some

Fuels Taxes Between the State of Nebraska and the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, Part IV.9, Jan. 24, 2002,
https://revenue.nebraska.gov/sites/revenue.nebraska.gov/files/doc/motor-fuels/legal/Agreement%20with%20
Winnebago%20Tribe%20Jan%202002.pdf [hereinafter Winnebago Tribe Agreement] (allocating to the state
twenty-five percent of the revenue from a tribal excise tax on fuel sales to non-Indians, which are exempt from
state tax).
162. Some allocations are based on the population of tribal nations, which in turn are based on the number
of enrolled members who reside within the tribal reservation boundaries. See Crow Tribe-Montana Tobacco Tax
Agreement, Crow Tribe-State of Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, § 5(a), May 13, 2005, https://mtrevenue.gov/?mdocsfile=57501 [hereinafter Crow Tribe Agreement] (“For each calendar quarter, the Tribe shall receive an amount
of tobacco taxes pre-collected for tobacco sales on the Reservation, which approximates the sales to enrolled
Crow tribal members living on the Reservation. The amount of tobacco taxes that the Tribe receives shall be
determined by multiplying 150 percent of the Montana per capita tobacco tax collected for the calendar quarter,
times the total number of enrolled Crow tribal members living on the Reservation.”). Other allocations are based
on the population of all enrolled members, regardless of whether they live within the tribal territorial boundaries.
See Northern Cheyenne Tribe-Montana Tobacco Tax Agreement, Northern Cheyenne Tribe-State of Mont.,
§ 5(a), Mar. 20, 2012, https://mtrevenue.gov/?mdocs-file=57543 (“The amount of tobacco taxes that the Tribe
receives shall be determined by multiplying 150 percent of the Montana per capita tobacco tax collected for the
calendar quarter, times the total number of all enrolled Northern Cheyenne tribal members living on the
Reservation.”).
163. Other complex formulae for fuel-tax revenue sharing are based on fuel sold to exempt parties (a tribe
or tribal members). See Intergovernmental Agreement Between Arizona Department of Transportation and
Navajo Tax Commission: Establishing Cooperative Fuel Tax Administration, § 3.7, May 7, 1999, https://sct
.narf.org/documents/richardsvpbp/TRIBAL-STATE%20FUEL%20TAX%20AGREEMENTS/NAVAJO%20
NATION-ARIZONA%20AGREEMENT.pdf [hereinafter Navajo Arizona Agreement] (providing that the state
agrees to refund state fuel taxes paid on sales to tribal members or entities based on vendor records).
164. See Fletcher, supra note 153, at 5; see also State of Michigan Generic Tax Agreement, Apr. 13, 2018,
https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/taxes/Tribal/Generic_StateTribal_Tax_Agreements_and
_Amendments.pdf?rev=7be4d312f2d445508d042a26c16b347c.
165. See, e.g., Tax Agreement Between the Bay Mills Indian Community and the State of Michigan,
§ III(B), Dec. 20, 2002, https://www.michigan.gov/taxes/-/media/Project/Websites/taxes/Tribal/BayMillsFinal
TaxAgreement.pdf?rev=256034e146e947ea93bdb7927cee6dcc&hash=E6BAD7D4DD6C045939E68718E8B2
4FDA [hereinafter Bay Mills Agreement].
166. See, e.g., id.
167. Id. § III(B)(3)(a).
168. Id. § III(B)(3)(b).
169. Id. § III(B)(2).
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compacts explain the formula for allocations based on population or estimates,
but most do not.170
It is impossible to evaluate the impact or fairness of a compact based on
the revenue sharing arrangement without considering the arrangement, if any,
between the state and the tribe for funding governmental services within the
tribal territory.171 Compacts may also contain provisions that limit the tribe’s
spending of the revenue, often through a requirement that the tribe spend the
revenue on broadly defined “essential governmental services.”172
Most tax compacts with revenue allocation provisions also address various
tax administration issues. Tax administration issues such as recordkeeping,
remittance and payment, auditing, and enforcing noncompliance are particularly
important because of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.173 The
administrative provisions in tax compacts allow states to avoid tribal sovereign
immunity in enforcing the terms of the tax agreement.
Because many compacts address the imposition of state retail sales or
excise taxes upon non-Indians in transactions where the tribe is acting as a
retailer, common terms regarding tax administration prescribe the administrative
obligations of a tribe in enforcing state taxes. For example, compacts address
who bears the legal obligation for collecting taxes and remitting money to
relevant tax authorities.174 Provisions often address keeping records and other

170. See Winnebago Tribe Agreement, supra note 161, Part IV.9 (explaining allocation based on the nonIndian population residing within the territorial boundaries of the Tribe’s reservation).
171. See, e.g., Paul Spruhan, Standard Clauses in State-Tribal Agreements: The Navajo Nation Experience,
47 TULSA L. REV. 503, 505–09 (2012) (discussing funding agreements outside the scope of tax revenue sharing
between the Navajo Nation and the three states in which the Navajo Nation is geographically located); see also
Cowan, supra note 144, at 27 (noting the difficulty in determining “winners” and “losers” of a compact without
knowing spending arrangements, specifically on infrastructure and services in Indian Country).
172. Suquamish Tribe Agreement, supra note 146, § V(F)(1). This limitation on spending is particularly
true in cases where the tribe is entitled to keep all the revenue generated by the on-reservation transactions. See,
e.g., id.; Iowa Tribe Compact, supra note 160, art. II, §§ 7, 10–15 (allocating to the Tribe all excise tax revenue
on tribal tobacco sales to non-Indians, and the Tribe agreeing to stamp requirements for tobacco). It also applies
in cases where the revenue is split between the tribe and state. See Fort Peck Tribes Agreement, supra note 146,
§ VIII (allocating fifty percent of the tax revenues covered by the Agreement to the Tribe).
173. See supra Part I.B.2.c.
174. See, e.g., Fuel Tax Agreement Between the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe and the State of Nevada, at 2,
Apr.
5,
2002,
https://sct.narf.org/documents/richardsvpbp/TRIBAL-STATE%20FUEL%20TAX%20
AGREEMENTS/PYRAMID%20LAKE%20PAUITE%20TRIBE-NEVADA%20AGREEMENT.pdf
[hereinafter Pyramid Lake Paiute Agreement] (delineating responsibility for all administration, enforcement,
and collection, including imposition and collection of state fuel tax on “at-the-pump” purchases, to the tribe or
tribal retailers); Bay Mills Agreement, supra note 166, § III(B) (requiring the Tribe to collect and remit
applicable sales taxes as prescribed in agreement).
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related documents.175 Other enforcement issues include auditing, information
sharing, and disclosures.176
The terms of some compacts require the state to assume all administrative
and enforcement responsibilities, even over transactions occurring in Indian
Country by tribal retailers.177 In order to accomplish this type of taxing structure,
the legal incidence of the tax must fall on the wholesaler or distributer before the
goods arrive in Indian Country for retail sale.178 This may free a tribe from the
cost of running its own tax enforcement agency, but it can also leave the tribe
vulnerable to potential abuse from state enforcement.179 In fact, multijurisdictional tax administration itself, irrespective of any revenue sharing, is so
important that at least one state has compacts with tribes within its borders just
to coordinate enforcement.180
Compacts illustrate cooperative sovereignty—sacrifice of tribal
sovereignty in exchange for certainty as to revenue and administration. Another
universal feature of existing tax compacts is diversity—they reflect wide

175. See, e.g., Bay Mills Agreement, supra note 166, §§ VIII–XII (containing five separate sections of
administrative provisions). The Michigan tax compacts are somewhat unique, because they cover an array of
taxes, including sales, fuel, tobacco, income, and business taxes. See id.; see also Navajo Arizona Agreement,
supra note 163, § 3.12 (requiring that the Navajo Nation keep records such as invoices, receipts, and records
required to support the terms of the compact and allowing the state to audit retailers within the reservation). But
see Fuel Tax Agreement Between the Walker River Paiute Tribe and the State of Nevada, at 2, Nov. 21, 2002,
https://sct.narf.org/documents/richardsvpbp/TRIBAL-STATE%20FUEL%20TAX%20AGREEMENTS
/WALKER%20RIVER%20PAIUTE%20TRIBE-NEVADA%20AGREEMENT.pdf [hereinafter Walker River
Paiute Agreement] (containing minimal administrative provisions, because the state pre-collects all taxes and
refunds them to the Tribe based on the average consumption of the number of residents). Consequently, the state
has no concerns about remittance and jurisdiction. See Walker River Paiute Agreement, supra.
176. See, e.g., Navajo Arizona Agreement, supra note 163, § 3.9.2 (requiring specific books and
recordkeeping by fuel distributors and vendors); Crow Tribe Agreement, supra note 162, § 7 (permitting either
party to examine, audit, or use a private auditor, and requiring confidentiality of any investigation).
177. See, e.g., Navajo Arizona Agreement, supra note 163, § 3.7 (explaining refund allocations made by the
state to the Tribe for tax-exempt purchases).
178. Common examples of types of products include tobacco products or motor fuel, both of which can be
taxed at the wholesale level. See, e.g., Crow Tribe Agreement, supra note 162, § 5 (providing that the state
tobacco tax be pre-collected from wholesalers and cigarettes marked with state tax insignia).
179. But see Pyramid Lake Paiute Agreement, supra note 174, at 2 (compensating the Tribe for tax
enforcement by allowing the Tribe to retain ten percent of the revenue owed to the state).
180. For example, the state of New Mexico does not have revenue sharing compacts. However, it has
numerous compacts that address tax administration across tribal territorial borders. See Cooperative Agreement
Between New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department and Pueblo de Cochiti Division of Revenue:
Resolution No. 2006-01, § 1, Mar. 23, 2006, https://klvg4oyd4j.execute-api.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/prod
/PublicFiles/34821a9573ca43e7b06dfad20f5183fd/2f0598fd-5890-4b51-82d4-7b88d2e8cb22/Pueblo%20de%
20Cochiti%20and%20NM%20Taxation%20and%20Revenue%20Department.pdf (“The Department and the
Division enter into this Agreement in order to provide for the exchange of information and the reciprocal, joint
or common enforcement, administration, collection, remittance and audit of gross receipt taxes of the party’s
jurisdictions.”). New Mexico also has a state tax credit available to businesses engaging in commercial activity
in Indian Country that would otherwise be subject to taxation by both the tribe and the state. See N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 7-9-88.1 (1978). Because of this credit, revenue allocations are unnecessary to resolve potential
duplicative taxation.
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variations in the types of state and tribal taxes, tax and economic policy
objectives, available resources, and geographic factors.181
II. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT COMPACTS HAVE ON
TRIBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
As explained in the previous Part, tribal governments cannot realize selfdetermination without economic self-sufficiency.182 Economic self-sufficiency
depends on economic development, which itself has two components: (1)
investment by business ventures, and (2) tax revenues generated by the
ventures.183 Because juridical taxation threatens economic development by
forcing a tribe to choose between generating tax revenue or the business venture
itself, compacts offer a compromise.184
Evaluation of the relative merits of tribal-state tax compacts has mostly
been confined to skeletal analysis of the pros and cons for both compacting
parties.185 Existing literature claims that compacts provide multiple advantages
for both tribes and states. Compacts help avoid litigation over taxing authority,
which gives the parties certainty over tax revenues and enables advanced
planning of government budgets.186 Compacts are also viewed as a “more
viable” option for tribes compared to legislative solutions to tax issues.187
However, compacting has downsides for tribal governments, in that tribes may
come to the table with unequal bargaining power relative to the state, leading the
tribe to “surrender more rights” than it would in an equal negotiation.188
It is important to keep in mind that the quantity and diversity of tribal
nations makes it impossible to distill any generalized principles from the pros
and cons of compacting that apply to all Indian Country. Each of the fifty states
and each of the 574 federally recognized Indian tribes (plus additional state
recognized tribal governments) have their own economies, resources, and
governmental priorities.189
The analysis here does not purport to resolve the question of whether
compacting is net positive or net negative for tribes and states. Instead, it offers
a deeper understanding of compacting and the relationship between compacting
and tribal economic development, using the two categories of transactions
outlined in the previous Part.

181. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing state and local tax revenue streams and tribal tax revenue streams).
182. See supra Part I.B.
183. See supra Part I.B.1.
184. See supra Part I.B.1.
185. See Cowan, supra note 4, at 134–35.
186. Id. at 134 & nn.219–20.
187. Id. at 134 & nn.221–22. But see Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public
Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1799 (2019) (arguing that Congress and the executive branch have “provided
sanctuary” for tribes through lobbying).
188. See Cowan, supra note 4, at 134–35, 134 nn. 221–23.
189. See supra Part I.A.3.
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This Part breaks down into three strands of analysis. First, it analyzes the
incentives states and tribes have in creating tax revenue compacts to understand
the correlation between compacts and tribal economic development activities.
The incentives reveal states’ and tribes’ motivations for compacting. Those
motivations suggest that when a tribe is acting as a retailer, the tribe itself may
have continued or even increased economic opportunities and yet struggle to
attract outside investors to partner in economic development activities within
Indian Country. Second, using tax policy principles to assess the impact
compacts have on economic development, this Part identifies and analyzes costs.
Finally, this Part posits an alternative framework warranting further research that
addresses juridical taxation and stimulating economic development in Indian
Country.
A. THE PARTIES’ INCENTIVES TO COMPACT CORRELATE WITH ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN INDIAN COUNTRY.
The efficacy and value of compacts cannot be measured simply in absolute
dollars or revenue generated by the governmental entities under the compact,
because that ignores the economic value created by the business venture itself.
Instead, a more useful question in evaluating the relative benefits of compacting
is what impact compacts have on tribal economic development at large. What
business ventures does the compact encourage, and what additional revenue is
derived from taxing those ventures?
Existing law shapes the incentives for states and tribes to compact. The
incentives vary depending on whether the transaction being taxed is a tribe-asretailer or a tribe-as-partner transaction. In turn, the incentives yield compacts
that reveal the economic development opportunities—or the lack thereof—
available to tribes.
1.

The Incentives To Compact in Transactions Where the Tribe Is a
Retailer

Under existing law, when a tribe is engaged in business as a retailer within
Indian Country, consumers who are not members of the particular Indian tribe
within whose territory the business is located may be subject to both state and
tribal consumption taxes.190 Only in cases in which the tribe “adds value” to the
item sold will a state tax be invalidated.191 While states and tribes may dispute
what constitutes the added value sufficient to preempt state taxes, the law is
otherwise relatively certain as to when a state has concurrent taxing authority,

190. Courts have also interpreted state authority as regulating “nonmember Indians” within Indian Country,
in addition to regulating non-Indian individuals and businesses. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Rsrv., 447 U.S. 134, 161 (1980) (determining that nonmember Indians “stand on the same footing”
as non-Indians); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 446 (1997) (drawing the line for civil jurisdictional
authority between tribal members and nonmembers); see also supra Part I.B.
191. See supra Part I.B.2.c.
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especially in the case of tribes selling tobacco.192 When both the state and tribe
have concurrent authority to tax, as a practical matter, a tribe will be forced to
either cede taxing authority or impose additional tribal taxes on the nonmember
consumer and risk losing retail sales opportunities altogether.193 Furthermore, a
state can impose administrative burdens on a tribe to collect a tax.194 To enforce
or collect the tax, states still face the obstacle of tribal sovereign immunity.195
Thus, under existing law, tribes are incentivized to compact with states for
tax revenue, because the imposition of both state and tribal taxes would deter
consumers from doing business in Indian Country, and by extension chill
economic development for the tribe. In such scenarios, a tribe will be motivated
to compact based on the reasoning that ensuring some revenue sharing or market
share in retail sales is better than none. For example, the provisions on revenue
sharing in Michigan’s standard tax compact allocate revenue according to retail
gross receipts.196 Under the terms of those compacts, tribes are entitled to the
first two-thirds of tax revenue generated on the first $5 million in receipts.197 For
gross receipts over $5 million, the tribe and state split the revenue fifty-fifty.198
For Michigan tribes that agree to these terms, reducing the share of the revenue
appears to be an acceptable term.
Existing law creates different, but no less compelling, incentives for states
to enter tax compacts that cover transactions where the tribe is a retailer. States
have nothing to lose from seeking juridical taxation, and everything to gain.199
States are, however, motivated to engage in tax revenue compacts to create
administrative cohesion for tax enforcement across tribal boundary lines. Retaillevel sales or excise taxes are difficult to enforce, especially by a state
government attempting to collect from another sovereign, the tribal
government.200 Although the law has developed in a manner favorable to states
even on enforcement, the costs associated with enforcing the law and requiring
tribal governments to comply with recordkeeping and remittance of sales and
excise taxes are strong incentives for a state to compact. Many, if not most or
even all, of the compacts regarding tax revenue sharing also include agreements
regarding administration such as recordkeeping, auditing practices, and
remittance.201

192. See supra Part I.B.2.c.
193. See supra Part I.B.3 for a discussion on the double bind of juridical taxation.
194. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 160.
195. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509–10 (1991).
196. See, e.g., Bay Mills Agreement, supra note 166, § III(B); see also supra Part I.C.2.a.
197. See, e.g., Bay Mills Agreement, supra note 166, § III(B).
198. Id.
199. See supra Part I.B.3. Because the retailers who would suffer from concurrent taxation are tribes or
tribal entities, states face no risk in imposing their tax on tribal retailer sales.
200. See supra Part I.B.2.c (discussing a state’s ability to require a tribe to collect and remit taxes to the
state).
201. See supra Part I.C.2.b (providing examples of agreements as to tax administration matters between
tribal governments and states).
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Another incentive for states to enter tax revenue compacts stems from fear
of competition from tribal retail ventures. Even though the law regarding
concurrent taxation and administration favors states, states frequently accuse
tribes of attempting to market an exemption from state tax in an unfair way.202
This is especially true in the context of excise taxes, such as those on tobacco,
fuel, and alcohol.203 This perceived unfair practice motivates states to compact
in order to preempt tribes from attempting to market an exemption in the first
instance, thereby avoiding litigation.204 Existing law creates different incentives
for tribes and states, but these incentives are similar in importance to each.
Tribes are motivated to resolve juridical taxation issues and preserve revenue
streams and market shares, while states are motivated to resolve administrative
issues and avoid contending with tribal sovereign immunity in order to enforce
state taxes.
2.

The Incentives for States and Tribes in Transactions Where a Tribe
Is Acting as Partner with Nonmember Businesses

Under existing law, when a tribe partners with nonmember businesses to
engage in commercial activity within Indian Country, the nonmember individual
or entity may be subject to both state and tribal taxation for the commercial
activity.205 Courts employ the White Mountain Apache analysis to determine the
validity of state taxes on these commercial activities; this analysis is complex
and can yield seemingly contradictory results.206 The complexity and
uncertainty in these types of cases influence states’ and tribes’ incentives in
different ways.
The lack of certainty over what taxation authority states have over
nonmember commercial activity in Indian Country likely motivates tribes to
compact with states to alleviate juridical taxation over nonmembers who do
business in Indian Country. This is the same incentive tribes have with respect
to transactions in which tribes are acting as retailers.
The lack of certainty surrounding taxing authority over nonmembers doing
business with tribes as partners does not impact the incentives of the state in the
same way. As in transactions where the tribe is a retailer, a state has nothing to
lose in seeking to tax transactions where the tribe is a partner with nonmember
businesses. Unlike tribal retailer transactions, the administrative challenges in
202. COHEN, supra note 1, § 8.03[d] & n.167.
203. See supra Part I.C.
204. There is a double standard in this jurisprudence; while it denies tribes the sovereignty to impose a
consumption tax of their choosing, it ignores the reality of tax havens and tax arbitrage that happens at the
interstate level. See Fletcher, supra note 66, at 787–88, 787 n.188. At the interstate level, such tax arbitrage is
accepted and well known. For example, tax arbitrage occurs at the border of Washington and Oregon. Oregon
has no sales tax and Washington has no individual income tax. High net earners can reside in Washington and
work in Portland to avoid state income tax. Similarly, consumers in Vancouver can shop in Oregon to avoid
sales tax.
205. See supra Part I.B.
206. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980); see also supra Part I.B.2.c.
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enforcing the tax are different in transactions where the tribe is a partner. In
transactions where a state asserts taxing authority over the business affairs of a
nonmember, the state has minimal concerns regarding tax enforcement and
administration. The state already has taxing authority over the nonmember by
virtue of the business’s residence within the state.207
Another reason a state may lack incentive to compact is because a state
may be indifferent or adverse to encouraging additional economic development
in Indian Country. Indifferent at best and adverse at worst, a state may see the
tribe as competition to its own economic development.208
The incentives for tribes and states in transactions where the tribe is a
partner are therefore asymmetrical in importance. Tribes, often eager to engage
and attract outside business investment, remain incentivized to compact around
juridical taxation to encourage that investment. States, however, have no
administrative challenges to contend with in enforcing taxes on non-Indian
businesses within the state, and consequently may not be interested in
compacting to help tribal economies grow.
3.

Existing Compacts Between Tribes and States Reflect the Incentives
of the Parties and Reveal the Impact Compacts Have on Economic
Development Opportunities in Indian Country in Both Types of
Transactions.

Existing compacts between tribes and states reflect the incentives, or lack
thereof, of the parties. There are many compacts involving transactions where
the tribe is a retailer, such as compacts resolving sales and excise taxes, because
the parties are both incentivized to compact in such situations.209 This is
especially evident in the number of compacts addressing tribal sales of tobacco,
fuel, and alcohol.210
Given the lack of incentives for a state to enter a compact where a tribe is
a partner, it is unsurprising to see that few compacts address taxation of
nonmembers doing business with tribes as partners in Indian Country. Almost
all the tax revenue compacts related to non-Native American Indian businesses

207. Generally, a state has broad constitutional taxing authority over the income earned by its residents. See
2 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION: SALES AND USE, PERSONAL INCOME,
AND DEATH AND GIFT TAXES, AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES ¶ 20.04[1] (3d ed. 1998).
208. See Matthey L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies” Model of Tribal-State Relations,
43 TULSA L. REV. 73, 73–74 (2007) (explaining how the “age-old, intergenerational enmity between the people
of Indian communities and the non-Indians who live on or near Indian Country” has changed from physical to
political and legal violence and economic competition). There is empirical evidence that proves that when tribal
economies thrive, the state and local governments in which the tribe is located also benefit economically. See
Kelly S. Croman & Jonathan B. Taylor, Why Beggar Thy Indian Neighbor? The Case for Tribal Primacy in
Taxation in Indian Country, JOINT OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON NATIVE AFFS., May 4, 2016, at 14–17 (providing
examples of how tribal economic development helps grow state and local economies). For further literature and
citations, see generally Browde, supra note 75.
209. See supra Part I.C.
210. See supra Part I.C.
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involve the development or processing of natural resources existing in Indian
Country.211
However, a recent compact between the Tulalip Tribes and the state of
Washington is an exception.212 Rather than involving natural resources, the
Tulalip compact addresses state and local business-operations taxes and retail
sales taxes applied to nonmember retail businesses that operate within Tulalip
property.213 The compact was entered into to settle a dispute after a federal
district court issued an opinion adverse to the tribe.214 At issue in the case were
state and local sales taxes and a state business-operations tax imposed on sales
at a retail shopping center operating on the Tulalip Reservation.215 Notably, most
of the retailers were nonmember businesses.216
The Tulalip compact allocates all business-operations tax revenue to the
Tribes.217 With respect to sales and use taxes, the first $500,000 of revenue is
allocated to the Tribes.218 For revenue in excess of $500,000, the allocation
formula depends on whether a tribe has made a “qualified capital investment.”219
The “qualified capital investment”—which is also a part of the deal—means that
a tribe agrees to invest $35 million in the construction of a “civil commitment
facility” within its territory, apparently in exchange for tax revenue.220
The Tulalip compact appears to be unique in addressing a state tax on a
nonmember business operating within Indian Country. Other than in the context
211. See supra Part I.C.
212. Tax Sharing Compact Between the Tulalip Tribes and the State of Washington, Tulalip Tribes-Wash.,
July 1, 2020, https://www.hca.wa.gov/assets/program/tax-sharing-compact-tulalip-tribes-of-wa-and-wa-state
.pdf [hereinafter Tulalip-Washington Tax Sharing Compact].
213. Id. art. IV, §§ 3, 13–14 (defining “compact covered area,” “nonmembers,” and “nonmember
businesses”).
214. Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, 349 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1062–63 (W.D. Wash. 2018); see also
Washington’s Tulalip Tribes Reach Settlement with State, County in Tax Lawsuit, TRIBAL BUS. NEWS (Feb. 3,
2020),
https://tribalbusinessnews.com/sections/policy-and-law/11794-washington-s-tulalip-tribes-reachsettlement-with-state-county-in-tax-lawsuit. The preamble to the compact notes that “both the Tulalip Tribes
and the State desire a positive working relationship in matters of mutual interest and seek to resolve disputes and
disagreements by conducting discussions on a government-to-government basis.” Tulalip-Washington Tax
Sharing Compact, supra note 212, art. I.
215. Tulalip Tribes, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 1052–53. The Tulalip Tribes case offers an example of how the two
categories of economic development opportunities—tribes as retailers and tribes as partners—are
oversimplified. In Tulalip Tribes, the State sought to impose both retail sales taxes and business-operations taxes
over the non-tribal businesses. Id. The imposition of state consumption taxes over sales to nonmember
consumers by non-tribal retailers in Indian Country is a twist not addressed in the two categories identified for
the purposes of this Article. That the two types of economic development opportunities do not easily address
such a twist is not of serious consequence, because the construction of the retail space by the Tulalip Tribe was
based on the Tribe’s unique geographic location. Id. at 1049 (explaining how the retail center was located near
metropolitan Seattle). Thus, the case presented a set of circumstances not likely to be replicated by many other
tribes.
216. Id. at 1062–63. This point to emphasize is that this is not a scenario where the tribe is a retailer.
217. Tulalip-Washington Tax Sharing Compact, supra note 212, art. V, § 2(a).
218. Id. art. V, § 2(b).
219. Id. art. V, § 2(c)(2), (d)(2).
220. Id. art. VI (defining “qualified capital investment,” and setting forth terms for the tribe to construct the
civil commitment facility).
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of severance taxes on the extraction of natural resources, there do not appear to
be any other compacts that address the tax consequences of transactions where
the tribe is a partner.221 The Tulalip compact is also unique in that it shows how
revenue sharing can be inextricably connected with a funding arrangement. The
Tribes agreed to invest and build a facility at a cost of $35 million in exchange,
at least in part, for tax revenue.222 This highlights the complexity of funding
agreements between tribes and state and local governments.
Existing compacts, based on the incentives for states and tribes, reveal the
impact compacts have on economic development opportunities in Indian
Country. For economic opportunities where a tribe is a retailer, both states and
tribes are incentivized to compact. In compacts that cover tribe-as-retailer
transactions, tribes protect their market stake in retail transactions, and possibly
the sales tax revenues. States ensure that retail taxes are easy to enforce across
territorial borders in Indian Country. The research in this Article demonstrates
that numerous compacts cover such transactions.223
Where a tribe seeks to partner with nonmember businesses for development
in Indian Country, however, states are not incentivized to compact, because there
are no barriers to enforcement of state tax in such scenarios. The lack of
incentives for states correlates with few existing compacts that address
transactions where tribes partner with non-Indian businesses. The lack of
compacts makes it harder for tribes to attract investors and encourage outside
business to engage in Indian Country, stymieing economic development.
This is not to say that the lack of compacts is the causal explanation for
why tribes struggle to secure outside investment. Juridical taxation, whether
actual or potential, is just one obstacle tribes face in attracting outside investment
and business development. There are other issues such as lack of infrastructure,
geographic distance, and lack of specialized workforces.224 Furthermore, the
normal rules of engagement for business investment are different in Indian
Country, leading to a challenging landscape for investors.225 These are factors
tribes consider when creating economic development opportunities.226
The existence of compacts between states and tribes that address
transactions where the tribe is a retailer correlates with increased economic
221. It is difficult, if not entirely impossible, to quantify the negative. Furthermore, existing compacts can
be challenging to locate. See, e.g., Cowan, supra note 144, at 12–13 (noting the difficulties in locating existing
compacts and the consequences of such absence of information).
222. Tulalip-Washington Tax Sharing Compact, supra note 212, art. VI.
223. All the compacts referenced in Part I.C.2.a of this Article, with the exception of one—the Fort Peck
Tribes and State of Montana Oil and Gas Production Tax Agreement—cover transactions where the tribe is
acting as a retailer. See supra notes 151, 154, 156, 158, 161–68, 170–71, 175. Cf. Part II.A.3 (discussing few
compacts that exist where the tribe is acting as partner).
224. See Cowan, supra note 4, at 95 & nn.13–16 (citing testimony of Peterson Zah, President of the Navajo
Nation).
225. See Fletcher, supra note 66, at 785–87 (discussing structural discrimination in financing, lack of
acceptable collateral, tax rules with tribally issued municipal bonds, and capital flight as additional barriers to
tribal economic development).
226. See supra Part I.B.3.
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development opportunities for tribes. Compacts resolve the potential loss of
consumers for the tribe, should the state impose a duplicative tax, and settle any
potential enforcement challenges for the state. However, the lack of compacts
that address transactions where the tribe is a partner with non-Indian businesses
makes it challenging for tribes to attract investment from these businesses and
encourage them to engage in commercial activity within Indian Country.
B. COMPACTS HAVE ADDITIONAL NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES THAT HAVE
NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED IN EXISTING LITERATURE.
Compacts can also be analyzed under tax policy principles to determine
their impact on economic development opportunities. Compacts have been
described as an “incomplete” solution to juridical taxation.227 Existing literature
cites the downsides of compacting as creating agreements that are unfair to tribes
and politically untenable, in that they foster distrust among non-tribal voters.228
These concerns assume that compacting alone, if executed fairly and insulated
from political pressure, will solve the problem of juridical taxation.229
However, those assumptions miss a critical perspective. From a tax policy
perspective, compacting also degrades tax neutrality and creates economic
distortions, which ultimately hinder tribal economic development opportunities.
An overarching goal of tax policy is a principle that tax laws should be
“neutral.”230 Tax neutrality principles require that a tax system be designed to
minimize the impact the tax system has on individual choices.231 Tax neutrality
thus requires that the tax system not distort the economy.232 In the context of
disputes over juridical taxation in Indian Country where there is a geographic
boundary between differing tax laws, the principle of tax neutrality is referred
to as a locational neutrality.233
For example, historically, some tribal governments have tried to leverage
their sovereignty from state tax laws to attract investment. Some tribes marketed
retail sales on their reservations as free from state taxation, offering sales-tax227. See Cowan, supra note 4, at 135.
228. See id. at 134–35. Voter distrust has been cited as a downside to compacting. Id. at 135 (“[V]oters may
view compacts skeptically.”). The particular concern is that members of non-Indian communities may voice
political disagreement with compacting. See id. This distrust is based on historical prejudices, misunderstanding
of tribal economics, and racial enmity. See Fletcher, supra note 66, at 789–92 (providing examples of anti-Indian
rhetoric regarding perceived injustices favoring Indian people).
229. This Article does not argue that the concerns with compacting articulated in other articles are invalid
or unimportant. To the contrary, the analysis raises additional concerns about the use of compacting.
230. MCMAHON, supra note 73, at 103.
231. Id. at 104. For examples of tax neutrality, pareto efficiency, and citations to tax policy literature and
economic literature in support of those policies, see David Elkins, A Critical Reassessment of the Role of
Neutrality in International Taxation, 40 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 8–14 (2019).
232. MCMAHON, supra note 73, at 102 (“[S]ignificant attention should be given to ensure that the taxes that
must exist do not distort choices any more than necessary to permit the free market to operate as best as
possible.”).
233. See Cowan, supra note 4, at 126. Professor Cowan discusses distortions resulting from taxation in
Indian country vis-à-vis cigarette tax cases. Id. at 114–17.
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free shopping.234 This is a common practice among state and local governments.
There are numerous recent examples of states and local governments creating
tax incentives to attract investment or businesses.235 For example, when Amazon
shopped for the location of a second corporate headquarters, it sought state and
local tax incentives that allegedly cost taxpayers $3.4 billion.236 However, the
case law that developed in response to tribes engaging in the same practice
prevents tribes from leveraging a state tax exemption to attract consumers.237
This so-called “race to the bottom,” where a state or municipality concedes tax
revenues to attract business investment, is a familiar predicament for tribes
forced to choose between imposing tribal taxes and attracting business.238 These
examples violate principles of tax neutrality, because they encourage transacting
parties to make decisions based on tax advantages rather than on other, non-taxrelated factors.
Compacting similarly violates principles of tax neutrality and creates
economic distortions. Compacting allows tribes and states to agree on terms that
deviate from otherwise generally applicable tax law.239 This deviation may
create a lack of consistency in applicable law as between tribal nations, which
in turn could further destabilize reservation economies.240
The distortion caused by compacts depends on the category of transaction
the compact governs. In transactions where a tribe is acting as a retailer,
inconsistent tax laws are most likely to hurt the tribe and not impact the
consumer. The existence of a compact in transactions where a tribe is a retailer
234. This double standard permits states and local governments to do what tribes are forbidden from doing.
See supra Part I.B.
235. See supra Part II.A.
236. See Jacob Passy, This Is What Amazon’s ‘HQ2’ Was Going To Cost New York Taxpayers,
MARKETWATCH (Feb. 16, 2019, 4:13 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/what-amazons-hq2-means-fortaxpayers-in-new-york-and-virginia-2018-11-14.
237. See supra Part I.B.3.
238. See supra Part I.B.3.
239. See supra Part I.C for examples of compacts where the applicable rate of tax in Indian Country is
different without the compact. This proposition, however, is not categorically descriptive of all possible tax
revenue compacts. Such compacts can include any terms agreed on by the parties, including a statement
confirming that the applicable law is that which is already in force under relevant tribal and state law. See supra
Part I.C.1.
240. A recent example may be instructive here. The state of Washington has twenty-five motor fuel
compacts with various Indian tribes located within the state. WASH. STATE DEP’T OF LICENSING, 2019 TRIBAL
FUEL TAX AGREEMENT REPORT 2 (2020), https://www.dol.wa.gov/about/docs/leg-reports/2020-Tribal-FuelTax-Report.pdf (categorizing existing tribal-state fuel tax compacts). The Yakama Indian Nation, located within
Washington state, is not one of them. See id. After the state asserted authority to impose its fuel tax on intrareservation fuel consumption by the Yakama Tribe, litigation ensued. Cougar Den, Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of
Licensing, 392 P.3d 1014, 1014–15 (Wash. 2017). Yakama Indian Nation maintained, and the Supreme Court
ultimately agreed, that the Washington state fuel tax did not apply based on treaty language. Wash. State Dep’t
of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1006 (2019). The litigation does not substantiate any assertion
that the lack of a compact between Yakama and Washington negatively impacted the Yakama Nation’s
economy. The example does highlight some of the costs for tribes without a compact—in this case, litigation.
The foundational issue of the entire dispute was Yakama’s right to travel for trade purposes, emphasizing the
connection between compacting and tribal economies. This example also highlights how Federal Indian law
itself lacks uniformity.
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does not hurt the consumer, because the tax rate remains the same for the
consumer. However, the inconsistency created by existing compacts does hurt
tribes, because a tribe without a retail sales tax compact has to choose between
imposing a tribal tax to generate revenue and attracting consumers.241
Accordingly, tribes without compacts will likely lose retail opportunities if they
impose a tribal retail tax, or have no revenue stream if they forgo the tax.242
In transactions where the tribe is acting as a partner with nonmembers, the
lack of consistency has a broader negative impact on tribal and state economies.
Because few compacts address taxes that arise when tribes act as partners,
leaving the state tax consequences of transactions uncertain, tribal governments
may struggle to attract outside investors and business development.243 This
particularly impacts the activities of nonmember businesses partnering with
tribes to extract or produce tribal natural resources, because many tribes need
outside contractors to engage in such activities.244 Economic analyses show that
tribes may not command market rates for resources when tax consequences are
uncertain.245 As with transactions where a tribe acts as a retailer, the lack of a
compact where a tribe acts as a partner negatively impacts the tribe.
These distortions from a system that violates tax neutrality have negative
impacts beyond reservation economies. When tribal resources are not utilized
and reservation economies remain undeveloped, state and local governments
miss out on opportunities for growth, too.246 As the economy on a reservation
grows, so grows the economy of the state in which the tribe is located.247
This analysis seeks to import notions of tax neutrality into a question of
Federal Indian law, though it is important to note that tax policy principles may
not easily align with principles of Federal Indian law. Compacts
notwithstanding, state tax law can apply inconsistently among tribal nations
based on respective treaties, making tax neutrality difficult to achieve. For
example, in Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., the
Yakama Indian Nation was the only tribe in the state of Washington without a
tax compact resolving the applicability of state fuel taxes.248 The Tribe claimed
that tribal retailers were exempt from state fuel taxes based on particular
241. See supra Part I.C for examples of how compacts remove the double taxation issue as to the consumer.
242. See supra Part I.B.3.
243. See supra Part I.B.3; see also Jensen, supra note 1, at 3–4 (“If a prudent investor cannot predict the tax
liability he will incur on his investment with reasonable certainty, he is likely to look for investment opportunities
elsewhere.”).
244. See Cowan, supra note 4, at 121 (citing to authority on development of natural resources).
245. See id. at 121–22.
246. These principles are distilled from the economic concept of “growing the pie,” or “pareto efficiency.”
See MCMAHON, supra note 73, at 103 (discussing the pareto efficiency principle). This principle is essentially
that, rather than tribes and states fighting over the tax revenue generated by tribal economies, policies where a
state cedes taxing authority, thereby stimulating economic growth for the tribe, will have corresponding
economic growth for the surrounding localities off-reservation. See Croman & Taylor, supra at note 208, at 14–
17; see also Crepelle, supra note 4, at 703 (documenting how reservation economies remain undeveloped).
247. See MCMAHON, supra note 73, at 103 (discussing the pareto efficiency principle).
248. 139 S. Ct. 1000 (2019); see also WASH. STATE DEP’T OF LICENSING, supra note 240, at 2.
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language in the Tribe’s treaty with the federal government.249 The Supreme
Court ultimately held that the treaty preempted application of general state tax
law, and thus that the Yakama Tribe and its tribal retailers were exempt from the
state tax law.250 The case ultimately was an expensive and time-consuming
process for the Tribe to protect its sovereignty and tax revenues. Moreover, the
result in Cougar Den was only because of the unique nature of the Tribe’s
treaty,251 illustrating how state tax law can apply inconsistently among tribal
nations based on respective treaties.
Furthermore, tax policy concerns are different from concerns focused on
protecting tribal sovereignty. What may be good tax policy (i.e., a neutral set of
rules) may ignore the important value of a tribe exercising its sovereignty to
pursue a compact (or not, as the Yakama Nation example demonstrates), even if
the existence of a compact between a particular state and a particular tribe creates
economic disincentives for another tribe.
This analysis should not be read to suggest that tax policy principles are
more important than promoting tribal sovereignty. The complicated reality of
Federal Indian law is that policies with respect to the 574 tribal nations, each
with its own values, culture, and preferences, may vary in how the tribe chooses
to propel itself toward self-sufficiency.252 That said, tribal sovereignty is not an
isolated, independent goal. There is a practical element to sovereignty, namely
economic self-sufficiency, that may be best achieved when both state and tribal
governments adhere to sound tax policy objectives.
C. ALTERNATIVES TO COMPACTING CAN ADDRESS JURIDICAL TAXATION
PROBLEMS BETWEEN TRIBES AND STATES.
If tribal economic development is the goal, and juridical taxation is an
impediment, it is logical that the literature has focused on compacts to resolve
juridical taxation. The analysis thus far challenges the existing literature and can
be summarized as follows. First, states lack incentives to compact, especially in
transactions where the tribe is acting as a partner with non-Indian businesses.
The lack of incentives correlates with few compacts and diminished economic
development opportunities for tribes to partner with outside investors and
businesses.253 Second, the use of compacts among tribes has a distortive
economic impact, reducing economic opportunities for tribes.254 This seemingly
contradictory set of conclusions—that the lack of compacts reduces economic
development opportunities and that the compacts themselves reduce economic
249. Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct. at 1005–06. After losing at the state trial and appellate level, Yakama County
and the state of Washington litigated the case all the way up to the Supreme Court. Id. at 1000–01.
250. Id. at 1006.
251. Id.
252. See Tribes, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR: INT’L AFFS., https://www.doi.gov/international/what-we-do
/tribes (last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
253. See supra Part II.A.
254. See supra Part II.B.
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development opportunities—creates confusion over what a potential solution to
juridical taxation might be.
The literature has conceived the solution to juridical taxation in Indian
Country as using narrow tools.255 Beyond compacting, other tools for resolving
juridical taxation involve federal policy. For example, the federal government
could create federal credits for juridical taxes paid in Indian Country, or increase
direct payments to tribes to account for forgone revenue in ceding taxing
authority to the state.256 A common argument is for Congress to preempt state
taxation in Indian Country.257 Other tools could involve policy changes at the
state level to allow for tribal primacy in taxation.258
While these tools may reinvigorate tribal governments with much-needed
cash, they do nothing to promote economic self-sufficiency, which is
foundational to tribal sovereignty and self-determination.259 Furthermore, given
the problems with non-Indian public perception and historical prejudices, there
are significant hurdles to policy-based approaches.
A broader rethinking of juridical taxation by both scholars and the courts
is taking place. Professor Maggie Blackhawk has articulated a new framework
for understanding the role of tribal governments in the U.S. constitutional
system.260 Professor Blackhawk argues that Indigenous peoples and their
communities are best served when the federal government has “bestow[ed]
power, not rights, through the recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty.”261 She
argues for tribal sovereignty as a solution, contending that tribes should be able
to “reclaim[] homelands and the political and economic power sufficient to
govern them.”262
The Supreme Court has similarly recognized the importance of territorial
sovereignty in the recent case McGirt v. Oklahoma.263 The legal issue in McGirt
was the reach of state authority in a geographic area that the Muscogee Creek
255. Cowan, supra note 4, at 133–34; Ansson, supra note 8.
256. Cowan, supra note 4, at 140–42 (federal credit system); id. at 142–43 (increasing direct payments).
257. Id. at 143 & n.267.
258. See Browde, supra note 75, at 29.
259. See generally, e.g., Crepelle, supra note 4 (examining the relationship between tribal sovereignty and
reservation economic development); see also Adam Crepelle, Decolonizing Reservation Economies: Returning
to Private Enterprise and Trade, 12 J. BUS. ENTREPREN. & L. 413, 455–58 (2019) (arguing how reforming
Federal Indian law can help develop tribal economies).
260. See Blackhawk, supra note 187, at 1797.
261. Id. at 1798. Professor Blackhawk has argued that compacting is a mechanism for the tribal government
to “represent the collective needs of [its] citizens.” Id. at 1867.
262. Id. at 1861–62.
263. 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020). But see Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, No. 21-429, slip op. at 1–3 (U.S. 2022)
(revisiting questions of territorial sovereignty and tribal jurisdiction). Unfortunately, any reliance on a cohesive,
pro-tribal sovereignty shift in doctrine from the current Supreme Court would be misguided. See Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, In 5-4 Ruling, Court Dramatically Expands the Power of States To Prosecute Crimes on Reservations,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2022, 12:35 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2022/06/in-5-4-ruling-courtdramatically-expands-the-power-of-states-to-prosecute-crimes-on-reservations/; Nick Martin, The Supreme
Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, Explained, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (July 1, 2022), https://www.hcn
.org/articles/indigenous-affairs-justice-law-the-supreme-courts-attack-on-tribal-sovereignty-explained.
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Tribe claimed was Indian Country, despite Oklahoma’s longstanding treatment
that the reservation had been disestablished.264 Agreeing with the Tribe, the
Supreme Court held that the reservation had remained, emphasizing the
importance of territorial sovereignty and the promises made to the Tribe at the
time a treaty had been made with the federal government.265
The tools for resolving tribal-state juridical taxation have been constrained
by limited conceptions of tribal sovereignty. Though tribes are sovereign in
many respects, the judiciary has cabined the power of tribes as “domestic
dependent nations.”266 Tribal governments are extra-constitutional or preconstitutional sovereigns—analogous to neither foreign nations nor states.267
Invigorating territorial sovereignty—and moving away from jurisprudence
entrenched in the legacy of allotment and termination—could provide the
necessary backdrop for solutions to eliminate juridical taxation.
Specifically, if tribal governments are afforded increased territorial
sovereignty by restricting state encroachment in Indian Country, it is possible
that the federal constitutional requirement of fair apportionment could apply.
Fair apportionment is one of four judicially constructed requirements that
ensures that a state tax does not unconstitutionally interfere with interstate
commerce.268 Fair apportionment prevents a taxing state from taxation
overreach; it constrains the taxing state by limiting the extent to which an

264. 140 S. Ct. at 2459. The specific issue involved state criminal jurisdiction over an individual Indian
person within the geographic area. Id. at 2456–57.
265. Id. at 2482. Whether McGirt represents a dramatic pivot in federal jurisprudence remains to be seen.
There have been several changes in the makeup of the Supreme Court since the opinion was issued, and it is
hard to predict whether a shift will happen, let alone how such a shift will impact taxation. See, e.g., Stacy L.
Leeds & Lonnie Beard, A Wealth of Sovereign Choices: Tax Implications of McGirt v. Oklahoma and the
Promise of Tribal Economic Development, 56 TULSA L. REV. 417, 423 (2021) (analyzing McGirt’s potential
impact on federal, state, local and tribal taxing authority).
266. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
267. Id. at 16. Although Justice Marshall referred to the Cherokee Nation as a “state,” it was not meant to
convey the same meaning or the same status that applied to states under the Constitution. Id. Instead, “state”
meant “a distinct political society separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing
itself.” Id.; see also Cowan, supra note 4, at 94 (“[T]raditional concepts and mechanism[s] for avoiding double
taxation that have developed in other multi-jurisdictional settings are not easily imported into Indian country.”).
268. Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause
has been interpreted to have dormant, or negative, implications restricting state and local government powers.
M. DAVID GELFAND, JOEL A. MINTZ & PETER W. SALSICH, JR., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION AND FINANCE IN
A NUTSHELL 20 (3d ed. 2007). The requirement that state taxes be “fairly apportioned” was articulated in
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, in addition to the requirements that (1) “the tax is applied to an activity
with a substantial nexus with the taxing State,” (2) “[it] does not discriminate against interstate commerce,” and
(3) “[it] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.” 430 U.S. 274, 274, 279 (1977); see also GELFAND
ET AL., supra, at 33–37 (discussing the Complete Auto Transit test). However, apportionment does not apply to
individual income taxes. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 207, ¶ 20.10. There is no constitutional
prohibition on a state taxing a nonresident who earns income within the state. See id. To prevent overlapping
taxation between the resident’s home state and the state where income is earned, states provide income tax credits
for personal income taxes paid to the other state. Id. (“Every state with a broad-based personal income tax
provides a credit for taxes that their residents pay to other states.”).
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interstate business can be taxed.269 Apportionment ensures that each state may
tax what fairly represents the income earned within that state’s geographic
jurisdiction.270
To be clear, applying the doctrine of fair apportionment would require a
change in existing law—a significant hurdle to undo over 200 years’ worth of
jurisprudence.271 The doctrine of apportionment does not apply to nonmember
businesses earning income within and outside Indian Country.272 Though no
state has income tax credits for taxes paid on income earned in Indian Country,
some states exempt sales by tribes from state sales taxes.273 Further research is
needed to understand how those tools could apply between states and tribes if
the scope of tribal sovereignty was expanded.
Apportionment could be a powerful tool to resolve juridical taxation
impacting transactions where tribes are acting as partners. Multi-state businesses
are already used to apportioning income among multiple states. Consequently,
nonmember businesses doing business in Indian Country would most likely be
able to account for their income within and without Indian Country with relative
ease. Fair apportionment could provide consistent, certain tax consequences for
nonmember businesses. Additionally, tribes could both attract investment and
keep the much-needed revenue. Tax credits or similar mechanisms could be a
powerful tool to resolve juridical taxation where a tribe is acting as a retailer,
ensuring that juridical taxation does not force a tribe to choose between
attracting consumers and tax revenue.
CONCLUSION
Tax revenue compacts between tribes and states have been regarded as a
cooperative solution to juridical taxation in Indian Country. Compacting has
provided parties with certainty and prevented litigation. However, compacts
have not lived up to the promise of resolving juridical taxation in a way that
ensures that tribes have adequate opportunities to grow their economies.
Compacts are underutilized in transactions where a tribe acts as a partner,
269. GELFAND ET AL., supra note 268, at 33 (“In the context of the dormant commerce clause, fair
apportionment refers to the extent which an interstate (or international) business can be taxed, by a particular
state, on its nationwide (or worldwide) income. . . . A commonly used apportionment formula incorporates the
relative proportion of payroll, property, and sales receipts of the company for its in-state operations compared
to the total of these three factors for its business as a whole (worldwide, if it is a unitary business). For example,
if the corporation does one percent of its ‘business,’ as computed by this multi-factor formula, within the taxing
state, then one percent of its total income may be used in computing the state’s corporate income tax.”).
270. The explanation of apportionment is simplified for purposes of this Article. In reality, it is a complex
doctrine. For a full explanation, see 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION:
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND CORPORATE INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAXES ¶¶ 9.01–.16 (3d ed. 1998).
271. See Pomp, supra note 2, at 1216 (arguing that a “robust and invigorated Indian Commerce Clause”
would surely have changed the outcome of the cases in the area of state taxation in Indian Country).
272. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 150–51, 150 n.26 (1982); see also COHEN, supra
note 1, § 8.05.
273. See IDAHO CODE § 63-3622Z (2022) (exempting tribe or tribal enterprise sales within the reservation
from state sales tax); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-164.13(25) (West 2022).
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probably because states lack incentives to enter compacts that cover such
transactions. Furthermore, compacts perpetuate a piecemeal tax landscape in
Indian Country, having a distortive effect on and further hindering tribal
economic growth.
Instead of sacrificing tribal sovereignty, an alternative to compacting could
be a wholesale shift in law and policy to strengthen tribes’ territorial sovereignty
and prevent state taxation within Indian Country. This shift would solve juridical
taxation and might provide more efficient opportunities for growing tribal
economies. More research is needed in this area to explore the possibilities.

